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INTRODUCTION 
The federal government is dysfunctional, largely because of Congress’s 
inability to pass laws that solve the problems facing the country. Numerous 
opinion polls rate Congress at the lowest levels in recent history.1 A 
president re-elected by a solid majority in 2012 found himself immediately 
hobbled by Congress’s obstructionism. American voters, frustrated by 
federal inaction, seemingly rewarded the same obstructionists in the 2014 
midterm elections. The federal government seems stuck in a cycle of 
despair. Although less dysfunctional than the federal government, in recent 
years states have swung wildly in ideological directions that sometimes 
diverge sharply from the median views of the state’s voters. Some states 
innovate and solve problems of concern to voters, to be sure, but there is 
also evidence that state governments do not accurately reflect the views of 
many states’ voters on a consistent basis. 
By contrast, numerous commentators praise cities, counties, and urban 
metropolises for taking the lead in tackling problems that the federal 
  
                                                                                                             
 1. E.g., Rebecca Riffkin, 2014 U.S. Approval of Congress Remains Near All-
Time Low, GALLUP (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180113/2014-
approval-congress-remains-near-time-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/9S2R-7SYT]. 




government and many states have fumbled: climate change, income 
inequality, paid sick leave, immigration reform, gay rights, public health, 
gun control, and others.2 Those lauding local governments have offered 
many reasons for their leadership in these areas. Some commentators have 
cited the smaller scale of local government and its knack for “practical” 
problem-solving.3 Others have highlighted the relative lack of veto points 
in the legislative processes of local government, which enables cities to 
overcome the inertia prevalent at the federal level.4 The concentrated, left-
leaning political preferences of urban voters, which can facilitate policy 
consensus on issues that might cause gridlock at other levels of 
government, undoubtedly play an important role.5 
Big cities as progressive islands in the statewide and national sea is 
thus a common theme in the local government literature. Inevitably, cities’ 
views on issues—as translated into policy—collide with the authority of 
state and federal actors representing a different electorate. How to resolve 
these disputes normatively and doctrinally receives much attention from 
local government scholars.6 Most scholars accept the status quo that 
                                                                                                             
 2. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: 
DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS AND RISING CITIES (2013); BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER 
BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING 
OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY (2013); see also Thomas L. 
Friedman, I Want to Be a Mayor, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/07/28/opinion/sunday/friedman-i-want-to-be-a-mayor.html [https://perma 
.cc/3LTT-4PA8]. 
 3. E.g., BARBER, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the “pragmatic, problem-
solving character” of cities). 
 4. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? 
Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1265–69 (2014) 
(arguing that cities’ streamlined legislative structures makes them better able to 
advance regulation of certain industries); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL 
REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 181 
(2011) (observing that cities, with unicameral legislatures, are less likely to “privilege 
the status quo” than governments with bicameral legislatures). 
 5. Diller, supra note 4, at 1262–65 (discussing big cities’ left-leaning political 
preferences); see also Jonathan A. Rodden, The Long Shadow of the Industrial 
Revolution: Political Geography and the Representation of the Left 60 (Mar. 25, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Louisiana Law Review), 
http://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FXY-P6RT] 
(“[A] relatively tight correlation between population density and left voting is quite 
ubiquitous in industrialized societies.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Kenneth Stahl, Preemption Federalism, and Local Democracy, 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2837905 [https://perma.cc/M7CS-WSDD]; Paul Diller, Intrastate 
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007). 




preemption by higher-level authorities, whether state or federal, is 
ultimately constitutional and, impliedly, democratically legitimate.7 Even 
those who argue that local ordinances should trump state law do so only 
in limited contexts, largely accepting the legitimacy of state and federal 
action.8 
This Article takes a different tack: it impugns the democratic legitimacy 
of the federal and state lawmaking processes from the perspective of large 
and densely populated urban areas. More specifically, this Article explains 
why the federal and state governments fail to represent the median voter, 
and how this failure systematically disadvantages the views of big-city 
residents. At the federal level, the anti-urban dynamic is most pronounced 
in Congress. Hence, the urban-centered majority that succeeded in electing 
a president in 2008 and 2012 has been stymied by a Congress that 
underweights urban votes. For example, despite more than 90% of the U.S. 
population supporting increased gun regulation after the Newtown school 
shooting—with support at its highest in urban areas—Congress failed to 
produce any meaningful legislative response. Although less obvious, many 
state legislatures shortchange the views of urban residents in favor of more 
rural and exurban voters. Thus, although a majority of a state’s voters 
might prefer to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, for 
instance, a state legislature’s anti-urban skew helps block any such 
expansion if the pro-expansion majority is concentrated in urban areas. 
As this Article will demonstrate in detail, the urban disadvantage at 
the national and state levels is the result of a combination of spatial, 
demographic, and legal forces. A significant ideological cleavage in 
partisan views exists between residents of large, dense, urban areas and 
those of outlying exurban and rural areas. This cleavage holds on a number 
of issues—gun control versus firearm “rights,” mass transit versus private 
automobiles, and fighting climate change versus promoting extractive 
industries. The cleavage does not conform perfectly to geography, of 
course. There are right-leaning pockets in dense urban areas and 
smatterings of left-leaning rural areas. But, generally speaking, left-leaning 
voters are intensely concentrated in densely populated urban areas; less 
densely populated suburban areas are more politically heterogeneous; and 
exurban and rural areas are strongly right-leaning, but not as intensely or 
uniformly as urban areas that lean left. 
                                                                                                             
 7. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 6, at 1138 (“In most states . . . the legislature 
is free to expressly preempt any local ordinance.”). 
 8. E.g., Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 181 (2005). 




Given this division of political views, the Constitution’s apportionment of 
two senators to each state irrespective of population contributes substantially 
to a national anti-urban skew. The other force at both the national and state 
levels is the use of winner-take-all, single-representative, contiguous 
districts. Under a system of national proportional representation, the spatial 
distribution of political preferences would not affect the translation of votes 
to seats—that is, left-leaning votes would have the same value in urban 
areas as they do in rural areas. Under a winner-take-all, district-based system, 
by contrast, left-leaning parties and candidates waste comparatively more 
votes in urban areas than their right-leaning counterparts do in exurban and 
rural areas. In other words, Republicans win more seats by 55% to 40%, 
while Democrats win more by 75% to 20%. Writ large, this dynamic 
explains, for instance, why Democratic House candidates won 1.4 million 
more votes than Republican candidates in 2012, yet Republicans comfortably 
retained their majority.9  
In the last two decades, Republican state legislatures have exacerbated 
the urban disadvantage by intentionally gerrymandering U.S. House and state 
legislative districts to favor the political preferences of exurban and rural 
areas. But, as this Article explains, the political effects of the spatial 
distribution of ideological and partisan preferences in a first-past-the-post 
system persist to some extent even without such gerrymandering. The 
phenomenon of “unintentional gerrymandering,” whereby urban-favored 
Democratic legislative candidates waste comparatively more votes in their 
districts than do Republicans in suburban-to-rural districts, puts urban voters’ 
political preferences at a structural disadvantage that is almost impossible to 
“correct” even with intentional, pro-Democratic gerrymandering. 
Part I of the Article explains the spatial distribution of political and 
ideological preferences in the United States. Part II offers the Article’s 
normative premises. The first, overarching premise is that a legislative system 
ought to represent the views of the median voter as expressed in periodic 
elections. To reach this goal, two subsidiary principles apply: the 
governmental system must comply with one-person, one-vote, and that 
system must not be systematically biased toward a particular political party. 
If a political party wins a clear majority of the popular vote over time, such 
votes must translate into legislative majorities with regularity. Part II then 
surveys the degree to which constitutional law and popular political 
culture have embraced these normative commitments and demonstrates 
that majoritarianism, in particular, enjoys strong support. 
                                                                                                             
 9. Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-
2012.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/7SN4-7FUD]. 




Using the normative framework articulated in Part II, Part III explains 
how the Senate’s egregious violation of one-person, one-vote is partly 
responsible for the urban disadvantage in the national lawmaking process. 
Part IV then details how the U.S. House of Representatives, while roughly 
compliant with one-person, one-vote, suffers from substantial partisan bias 
in a manner that shortchanges the political and ideological views of urban 
residents. Part IV explains how this bias results from not only pro-Republican 
intentional gerrymandering, but also unintentional gerrymandering and the 
presumed federal constitutional prohibition on House districts crossing state 
lines. Proceeding from Part IV’s explanation of unintentional gerrymandering, 
Part V examines state governments and explains how many state legislatures 
experience the same phenomenon as the U.S. House.  
Part VI looks at other structural biases against urban voters in the 
federal and state systems. Using Herbert Wechsler’s “Political Safeguards 
of Federalism” as a foil, this Part explains how urban metropolises lack 
similar structural safeguards in either the federal or state systems.10 For 
example, although state boundaries are honored in the selection of officials 
for the national government—senators represent entire states; members of 
the House represent part of only one state—local governments’ are not. 
The districts of House members and state legislators may slice through 
numerous cities and counties. This lack of structural protection for local 
government units compounds, or at least fails to remedy, the disadvantage 
that big-city residents suffer in the state and national lawmaking processes. 
This Article is the first of a two-part series. The second article in this 
series, to be published in a later issue of this law review, will assess the 
degree to which state constitutional home rule doctrine might correct the 
urban disadvantage explained herein. 
I. EMPIRICAL PREMISE: A SPATIALLY DIVIDED ELECTORATE 
Recent presidential elections have revealed a United States that is 
divided politically along geographic lines. This division transcends the 
well-known “red”–“blue” state dichotomy. At the presidential level, 
Democratic candidates rack up huge majorities of votes in densely 
populated cities and inner-ring suburbs, while Republicans excel to a 
lesser but still substantial extent in exurban and rural areas.11 The density 
                                                                                                             
 10. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543 (1954). 
 11. Dante J. Scala et al., Red Rural, Blue Rural? Presidential Voting Patterns in 
a Changing Rural America, 48 POL. GEOGRAPHY 108, 108 (2015) (documenting 
Democrats’ reliance on “strong performance in cities to offset a poor performance 




of an area’s population is an extraordinary predictor of which way it will 
vote in a presidential election.12 Although this dynamic does not hold in 
every single state, it is remarkably common throughout the nation. Even 
in “red” states, Republicans trounce Democrats overall, but Democrats 
win big cities, college towns, and other urbanized pockets. In “blue” states, 
the Democrats win big overall, but Republican candidates prevail by large 
margins in many—if not most—rural, sparsely populated counties.13 
Some have questioned the usefulness of presidential election data in 
establishing a spatial political divide given the unwieldiness of 
presidential platforms.14 Regardless, it seems reasonable to assume that 
while not perfect, presidential elections can convey some helpful 
information about the kinds of policies the electorate prefers.15 Whatever 
the limits of presidential returns, down-ballot elections for Congress, 
governors, and state legislatures also reveal a spatially divided electorate. 
To be sure, voters generally know less about lower-profile office holders 
and candidates and often vote on the basis of party affiliation or as a 
referendum on the president’s—or, in the case of state legislatures, the 
governor’s—performance.16 Many voters, however, are aware that their 
particular legislator will help determine the overall partisan composition 
and leadership of the body.17 Moreover, if voters choose down-ballot 
                                                                                                             
outside urban areas”); Josh Kron, Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide 
Is Splitting America, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics 
/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america 
/265686/ [https://perma.cc/J6S3-FE78]. 
 12. See Richard Florida & Sara Johnson, What Republicans Are Really Up 
Against: Population Density, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.city 
lab.com/politics/2012/11/what-republicans-are-really-against-population-density/39 
53/ [https://perma.cc/52PL-LWU3] (charting county population density versus 2012 
presidential election vote share). 
 13. See Kron, supra note 11. 
 14. See, e.g., Samuel J. Abrams & Morris P. Fiorina, “The Big Sort” That 
Wasn’t: A Skeptical Reexamination, 45 POL. SCI. & POL. 203, 204 (2012). 
 15. Id. (“[P]residential voting returns obviously are an important indicator of 
political preferences.”). 
 16. ROBERT P. STEED ET AL., SOUTHERN PARTIES AND ELECTIONS: STUDIES 
IN REGIONAL POLITICAL CHANGE 55 (2012) (stating that voters for lower-level 
offices often vote based on party affiliation because candidates are less well-
known). 
 17. Id. The degree to which American voters understand the basic functioning 
of the political system and accurately register their preferences when voting is the 
subject of much debate in the political science literature. For a commendable recent 
summary concluding that while “[v]oters make mistakes,” they are “nonetheless 
capable of providing useful feedback when armed with clear party labels . . . that 




candidates more on the basis of party affiliation than on the individual 
candidates’ positions, then any geographic trends in preference are even 
more indicative of an ideological divide. 
That left-leaning parties and candidates perform better in densely 
populated urban areas is not a new phenomenon. In his exhaustive study, 
political scientist Jonathan Rodden traces the dynamic back to employment 
and residential patterns formed during the Industrial Revolution, in the 
United States and beyond.18 Urban residents, clustered in “tight, 
uncomfortable living quarters and often-inhumane working conditions,” 
were “ripe for mobilization by socialist political entrepreneurs.”19 In some 
nations, far-left socialist parties succeeded in establishing proportional 
representation, which further strengthened their clout in the national 
legislature.20 In nations that retained single-member, geographic-district-
based legislatures, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, far-
left movements joined with other elements under the umbrella of a 
moderate-left political party, like the post-World-War-II Democrats, to 
exercise any clout. Thus, until fairly recently, urban areas strongly 
preferred Democratic candidates, and many rural areas did so as well.21 In 
the United States, therefore, according to Rodden, party identification or 
candidate preference was not always a great indication of an area’s true 
policy preferences and ideological leanings.22 
                                                                                                             
are consistent over time and available at the moment of decision,” see Christopher 
S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political 
Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 370–84 (2013). 
 18. Rodden, supra note 5, at 60 (“[A] relatively tight correlation between 
population density and left voting is quite ubiquitous in industrialized societies.”). 
 19. Id. at 9. 
 20. Id. at 30–51 (discussing examples from Continental Europe). 
 21. For instance, Democrats dominated the South in Congressional elections, 
even in rural areas, until as late as the 1980s. DAVID LUBLIN, THE REPUBLICAN 
SOUTH: DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTISAN CHANGE 1, 37 (2004) (noting Democratic 
dominance of Southern congressional delegations into the 1980s); Nicol C. Rae, The 
Democrats’ “Southern Problem” in Presidential Politics, 22 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 
Q. 135, 135 (1992) (noting that Democrats held approximately two-thirds of U.S. 
House seats in the South as late as the early 1990s). 
 22. Rodden, supra note 5, at 138, 167 (discussing left-wing Democrats’ 
alliance with Blue Dog or Boll Weevil Democrats). Rodden, however, may 
underestimate common ground shared by left-leaning urban areas and the rural, 
impoverished South, particularly in the pre-1960s social order, when racial and 
cultural issues were largely off the table. See Rae, supra note 21, at 136 (noting 
that the “economically-backward South” benefited disproportionately from 
FDR’s New Deal programs, which strengthened the Democratic party in the 
region); see also LUBLIN, supra note 21, at 29; MICHAEL J. WEBBER, NEW DEAL 




However ideologically disparate the Democratic party of old may 
have been, it has clearly become more uniformly “liberal” today, and more 
preferred than ever by residents of densely populated urban areas.23 
Similarly, the Republican party at the national level has largely lost its 
liberal, Northeastern wing and represents almost no inner-city House 
districts.24 To some extent, the urban dominance of the Democratic party 
is because of race: blacks overwhelmingly vote for Democratic candidates, 
while whites either split their votes or lean heavily toward the Republican 
party, depending on the region.25 Cities with large African-American 
populations, such as Detroit and Washington, D.C., therefore, overwhelmingly 
support Democratic candidates. But the urban preference for Democratic 
presidential candidates largely transcends race.26 By contrast, rural whites, 
                                                                                                             
FAT CATS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1936 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 101–02 (2000) (discussing enthusiasm for FDR among 
“ordinary Southerners” due to the region’s “pressing need for economic relief”). 
 23. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1077, 1086–87 (2014) (citing numerous sources) (arguing that today’s state and 
national parties are more partisan and ideologically cohesive than they were 
decades earlier); KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & 
CONGRESS 318 (2007) (“The collapse of the old southern Democratic Party has 
produced . . . two sharply distinct political parties,” reflecting a “degree of 
polarization in Congress . . . approaching levels not seen since the 1890s.”). 
 24. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1086–87; POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra 
note 23, at 318; Cliff Schecter, Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party’s 
March to the Right, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663 (2001). 
 25. See Peyton M. Craighill & Sean Sullivan, The Wide Racial Gap in Obama’s 
Presidential Elections, in 2 Charts, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 28, 2013), http: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/08/28/the-wide-racial-gap-in-oba 
mas-presidential-elections-in-2-charts/ [https://perma.cc/UQK7-U3BD] (noting that 
93% of black voters supported President Obama in his 2012 re-election, as opposed 
to just 39% of white voters); Obama Polled Low with Southern Whites, USA TODAY: 
THE OVAL (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/11/19 
/obama-southern-white-vote/1714291/ [http://perma.cc/BZB2-Z9DH] (citing exit 
polls showing that Obama won 10% of the white vote in Mississippi and 15% of the 
white vote in Alabama, as opposed to 51% of the white vote in Iowa). Hispanic 
Americans and Asian Americans have also preferred Democratic presidential 
candidates in recent years, although by a less robust margin than African Americans. 
See, e.g., Alexander Kuo et al., Why Do Asian Americans Identify as Democrats? 
Testing Theories of Social Exclusion and Intergroup Solidarity 1 (Feb. 20, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Mo02272014 
/KMM_AsianAmericans_20Feb2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/98VB-QK5C]. 
 26. See, e.g., Rodden, supra note 5, at 80 (discussing the 2004 presidential 
election); Richard Florida, What Is It Exactly That Makes Big Cities Vote 
Democratic?, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/politics 




particularly in the South and West, strongly prefer Republicans, whereas 
minority voters in rural areas often remain loyal Democratic voters.27 
Moving beyond party labels, scholars have attempted to discern the 
ideological preferences of city residents through opinion polls on specific 
issues. Ranking responses on a “liberal” to “conservative” scale, Chris 
Tausanovitch and Christopher Warsaw show that 38 of the 51 cities with 
populations greater than 250,000 are more liberal than the national mean.28 
Generally speaking, the larger the city, the older the city—which 
sometimes corresponds to population density—and if it is in the Northeast, 
Midwest, or along the Northern Pacific coast, the more liberal it ranks.29 
The smaller the city, the newer, and if it is in the South, lower Midwest, 
or Mountain West, the more conservative it ranks.30 
Another imperfect metric of the views of urban residents is the product 
of the local governments that represent them. The policies enacted by big 
cities undoubtedly reveal something about what urban residents want, 
even if there are many other factors at play.31 A quick look at the 
                                                                                                             
/2013/02/what-makes-some-cities-vote-democratic/4598/ [https://perma.cc/5XUD-
64UE] (reporting “no statistically significant association between a metro’s share of 
black residents and the share of Obama votes” in 2012). 
 27. See Andrew Gelman, The Twentieth-Century Reversal: How Did the 
Republican States Switch to the Democrats and Vice Versa?, 1 STATS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1 (2014) (explaining the movement of rural whites to the Republican party 
in the last three decades); Richard Morrill et al., Anomalies in Red and Blue: 
Exceptionalism in American Electoral Geography, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 525, 537 
(2007) (“The major . . . nonmetropolitan Democratic counties [include] ‘Black 
Belt’ counties in the south” and “several American Indian-dominated counties in 
the west and plains, and some areas with large Latino majorities, mainly along the 
border with Mexico.”). In Hawaii, which has the most diverse population of any 
state, including a very large percentage of Asian Americans, native Hawaiians, 
and mixed-race persons, William W. Welch, More Hawaii Residents Identify as 
Mixed Race, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com 
/news/nation/census/2011-02-24-hawaii-census_N.htm [https://perma.cc/9NKD-
LSF3], there is no discernible urban–rural split in political preferences. See 
Rodden, supra note 5, at 82. 
 28. Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in 
Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 609 fig.1 (2014). 
 29. Id. (The most liberal cities include San Francisco, Washington, D.C., 
Seattle, Oakland, Boston, Minneapolis, Detroit, New York, Buffalo, Baltimore, 
and Chicago.). 
 30. Id. (The most conservative cities include Mesa, Ariz; Oklahoma City, Okla.; 
Virginia Beach, Va.; Colorado Springs, Colo.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Arlington, Tex.; 
Anaheim, Cal.; Omaha, Neb.; Tulsa, Okla.; Aurora, Colo.; and Anchorage, Alaska.). 
 31. Id. at 625 (“[M]unicipal policy actions are related to citizen policy 
preferences.”). 




accomplishments or goals of major cities across the nation indicates a 
strong concern with economic inequality, climate change, immigration 
reform, gay rights, public health, and gun control.32 The distinctly urban 
nature of some of these issues, such as restricting guns, is obvious.33 In other 
instances, there is a connection between seemingly “local” issues, such as 
parking and transportation, and more global issues like climate change. In 
still other instances, such as gay rights or immigration reform, the urban 
agenda might reflect the influence of constituencies whose presence is 
proportionally larger in urban areas than in the general population. Finally, 
on issues like public health, there is no obvious reason why urban residents 
ought to care more about the issue than the rest of the nation.34 
Why urban residents prefer certain policies and candidates is a 
complicated question. Rodden points to the urban form as well as the 
propensity of urban residents to abandon traditional, “religious” values to 
which rural residents remain more steadfast.35 Others postulate that living in 
closer proximity to the poor leads to a greater willingness among the urban 
rich to be taxed for social welfare programs.36 Resolving the question of 
whether urban residence shapes political preferences or vice versa is 
beyond the scope of this Article.37 The goal here, by contrast, is to take 
urban ideological and political views as given and then show how the state 
and federal lawmaking processes systematically discriminate against 
them. 
                                                                                                             
 32. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Liberals Turn to Cities to Pass Laws and Spread 
Ideas, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016 
/01/26/upshot/liberals-turn-to-cities-to-pass-laws-and-spread-ideas.html?_r=0 [https: 
//perma.cc/YA4F-YZ8J]; BARBER, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that cities are 
“address[ing] . . . issues of weapons, trade, climate change, cultural exchange, crime, 
drugs, transportation, public health, immigration and technology”); Matthew J. 
Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional 
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 375 (2008) (noting 
local leadership in “policy areas such as climate change, gay rights and gay marriage, 
domestic partner benefits, affordable housing, campaign finance and other electoral 
reforms, health care, . . . term limits,” immigration, and living wage); Diller, supra 
note 4 (discussing cities’ public health regulation). 
 33. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 98–103 (2013) 
(discussing urban views on gun control). Blocher explains that “gun crime is clearly 
an urban problem,” and that “[c]ity-dwellers are roughly half as likely as rural 
residents to own guns, and are far more likely to support gun control.” Id. at 98–99. 
 34. See Diller, supra note 4, at 1247–48.  
 35. Rodden, supra note 5, at 10–11, 96–99. 
 36. See Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. 
PUB. ECON. 35, 38 (1973). 
 37. Rodden, supra note 5, at 97–99. 




II. NORMATIVE PREMISES: ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE 
AND PARTISAN FAIRNESS 
In any legitimate democracy, the elected representatives must fairly 
represent the views of the people. Essential to a democracy, therefore, is 
an effective means of turning the people’s sentiments into policy. In a 
representative democracy, this means is usually a periodic election of 
government officials who then wield the power to make policy. This 
Article embraces the normative view that any such government should 
roughly represent the median voter of the jurisdiction that elects it. A 
government thus composed should be able to put the majority’s broad 
policy preferences into law, subject to the normal rough and tumble of 
political dealmaking. This normative premise admittedly assumes that 
elected representatives are to some extent responsive to the policy 
preferences of their constituents—that is, legislators are not pure 
“trustees” but rather agents or delegates of the electorate at least in part.38 
The median-voter or majoritarian premise from which this Article 
proceeds is not without its prominent critics, distilled into two strains. The 
first, largely identified with the public-choice school, questions the 
knowableness of “the majority will.” According to this school of thought, 
voters’ collective preferences do not exist in the abstract, but are rather the 
inevitable product of the manner in which such preferences are solicited.39 
As such, measuring a political system’s worth by its success at representing 
the will of the majority is a fool’s errand. This Article, by contrast, assumes 
that voter positions on at least some issues are knowable. Public polling, 
despite its flaws, can reveal voter sentiment on key issues,40 and election 
results constitute credible evidence of voters’ views on issues.41  
                                                                                                             
 38. Whether legislators are more properly viewed as delegates or trustees is 
a longstanding, classic debate in the political science literature. See Rudy B. 
Andeweg, Roles in Legislatures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE 
STUDIES 267–68 (Shane Martin et al. eds., 2014) (recounting debate). 
 39. E.g., JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 155 
(1989) (“[T]he notion of a popular will is incoherent, or . . . the popular will is 
itself incoherent, whichever you prefer.”); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, 
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
 40. Justin H. Phillips, Public Opinion and Morality, in POLITICS IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 437 (Virginia Gray et al. eds., 
10th ed. 2012) (“The beauty of a well-constructed and properly administered poll 
is that it will usually provide a reasonably accurate snapshot of opinion.”); but see 
Adam J. Berinsky, The Two Faces of Public Opinion, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1209, 
1209 (1999) (arguing that opinion polls, under certain circumstances, may be a 
“poor reflection of collective public sentiment”). 
 41. See supra Part I.  




The other prominent objection to the median voter or majoritarian 
premise, associated most recently with Randy Barnett, objects to 
majoritarian government outright, at least when it interferes with pre-
existing natural rights.42 According to Barnett, the Constitution is designed 
not to allow the majority to effectuate its will, but rather to preserve 
fundamental rights.43 Whether Barnett is correct as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation is not germane to this Article, for the majoritarian premise 
embraced herein trumps even fealty to the Constitution. Regardless, as 
Section A explains, a strong strain of constitutional reasoning supports 
majoritarian governance. Moreover, Barnett’s objection largely collapses 
into the public-choice criticism, for it fails to provide an affirmative 
normative account for any means of electing public officials. If preservation 
of natural rights precedes a commitment to democracy, then it matters little 
who votes and whether they vote on equal terms. 
To be sure, insofar as Barnett and others are concerned with protecting 
minorities from majoritarian tyranny, this Article does not dispute the 
importance of that concern. Figuring out which issues should be “off the 
table” of majoritarian control through the mechanism of judicial review is 
the great project of constitutional law.44 This Article remains agnostic as to 
what rights the judiciary ought to protect through its interpretation and 
enforcement of the Constitution, and simply assumes that under any theory 
of judicial review, much will remain “on the table” for the elected branches 
to tackle. It is in this realm of the supposedly “democratic” branches—
particularly, the legislatures—that urban areas suffer a significant 
disadvantage. 
A. One-Person, One-Vote 
Compliance with one-person, one-vote is generally considered 
necessary for democratic governance; it is a short leap from this proposition 
to expect that one-person, one-vote is highly correlated with, if not 
                                                                                                             
 42. Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 
2576, 2602 (2014) [hereinafter We the People] (“[S]overeignty rests . . . in the 
people themselves considered as individuals.”); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11 (rev. ed. 2014) 
[hereinafter RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION]. 
 43. We the People, supra note 42, at 2602 (“[I]n the absence of express 
consent by each person . . . the only consent that can be attributed to everyone is 
consent only to such powers that do not violate their retained fundamental 
rights.”). 
 44. E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 




necessary for, a government’s ability to represent the median voter.45 If one 
segment of the voting populace exercises a franchise that has greater effect 
than another’s, the former will undoubtedly enjoy more influence on the 
lawmaking process. The Supreme Court recognized the normative 
imperative of majoritarian lawmaking in its twin landmark “one-man, one-
vote” decisions of 1964.46 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required state legislatures 
to adhere to the equipopulation principle in districting.47 In Wesberry v. 
Sanders, the Court held that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution required 
that U.S. House districts within states be equipopulous.48 
The movement toward one-person, one-vote as a fundamental 
constitutional value stretches back to the beginning of the Republic. The 
Framers haltingly embraced the principle by apportioning seats in the House 
of Representatives on a roughly equipopulous basis, an apportionment that 
the Electoral College reflects to a limited extent.49 In doing so, the 
Constitution reflected the colonists’ partial break with the British notion of 
“virtual representation,” whereby a member of Parliament was said to 
“represent” the whole of the realm, even if elected by a constituency in a 
particular borough.50 By using census figures to allocate House seats, the 
Framers staunchly rejected this view for at least one-half of the legislative 
branch of the federal government.51 Of course, the infamous three-fifth’s 
                                                                                                             
 45. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 2 (1971) 
(weighing citizens’ votes equally is a necessary condition for a democracy); see also 
Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel, Equal Representation in Two-Tier Voting Systems, 
28 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE 401, 401 (2007) (“The principle of ‘one person, one 
vote’ is generally taken to be a cornerstone of democracy.”). 
 46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
 47. Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533. 
 48. Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1. 
 49. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the Electoral College). 
 50. Edmund Burke famously declared that “Parliament is not a congress of 
ambassadors from different and hostile interests . . . but . . . a deliberative assembly of 
one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local 
prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of 
the whole.” Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, (Nov. 3, 1774), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html [https://perma.cc 
/GY32-HYDU]. For more on the former colonists’ break from the British notion of 
virtual representation, see GORDON S. WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 26–28, 38–39 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1969). 
 51. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 390 (James Madison) (M. Walter Dunne ed., 
1901) (“Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? . . . The electors 
are to be the great body of the people of the United States.”). 




compromise on counting slaves in the allocation of House seats,52 combined 
with the exclusion of women, Native Americans, and white males without 
property, demonstrated that the Founders had a narrow and compromised 
conception of which persons should select the representatives of the 
“people.”53 In other words, just as virtual representation is still generally 
seen as unproblematic vis-à-vis minors and noncitizens, the Framers viewed 
it as unproblematic vis-à-vis the other groups then excluded from the 
franchise. But for the “people” they considered worthy of exercising the 
franchise, the Framers took a significant step toward a representational 
model premised on one-person, one-vote. 
As the class of eligible voters broadened greatly over the next two 
centuries, the link between “the people” and their elected representatives 
grew less tenuous. Still, there remain large numbers of persons included 
in the census yet excluded from voting, such as noncitizens and millions 
of convicted criminals.54 Yet the notion that legislators represent the 
interests of all of the people in their districts is now far more credible than 
it was at the Founding, even if there remain major questions at the margins. 
One such question that the Supreme Court may soon decide is whether 
noncitizens and those not yet of voting age qualify as “people” for the 
purposes of allocating seats on the basis of one-person, one-vote.55  
It is at least hypothetically possible that a system not in compliance 
with one-person, one-vote might nonetheless represent the median voter. 
                                                                                                             
 52. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 253 
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (discussing 
three-fifth’s compromise and slaves’ “mixt [sic] character of persons and of 
property”). 
 53. Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. 397, 398 
(2009) (“Among those excluded from the franchise [when the Constitution was 
ratified] were women, African-American slaves, almost all Native Americans, 
and many poor white males, who were excluded by property qualifications and 
poll taxes.”). 
 54. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 5 (2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc 
/publications/fd_State_Level_Estimates_of_Felon_Disen_2010.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/M4F5-9YQB] (estimating that 5.85 million Americans are disenfranchised due 
to felony convictions). It is not just felons who are prohibited from voting; in many 
states, certain misdemeanants are also barred. See also Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1325 n.68 (2012) (noting effects on voting 
rights from misdemeanor convictions). 
 55. See Evenwel v. Perry, No. A–14–CV–335–LY–CH–MHS, 2014 WL 
5780507 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 
1120 (2016). 




Voters with a magnified franchise may hold the same political views as 
those whose franchise is diluted. In such a situation, the fact that the former 
set of voters receives more representation than the latter set should not 
affect the policies pursued by elected officials—the principle of one-
person, one-vote would be necessary to preserve individual dignity and 
abstract equality, but would not be necessary for representative fairness.56 
In Reynolds, however, the Supreme Court laid this fiction bare.57 Different 
sets of voters never hold the exact same mix of views on political issues, 
and augmenting the power of a geographic constituency’s clout is nearly 
certain to result in increased government spending on its behalf. The Court 
thus corrected disparities in the apportionment of legislative seats that 
were as egregious as 41 to 1.58 Similarly, in Wesberry, although relying on 
a different constitutional provision, the Supreme Court again strongly 
embraced a majoritarian ethos of representation in requiring that U.S. 
House districts within states be of equal population.59 Despite Reynolds’s 
and Wesberry’s strong embrace of majoritarianism, the ambiguity and 
occasional tension between the majoritarian and dignitary goals of one-
person, one-vote persist within the doctrine.60 
                                                                                                             
 56. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (“To the extent that a citizen’s right 
to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.”). 
 57. Id. at 565–66 (“[I]n a society ostensibly grounded on representative 
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State 
could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”). 
 58. Id. at 545. 
 59. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1964) (discussing the Framers’ 
contempt for Great Britain’s “rotten boroughs” in Parliament whereby “one man 
could send two members to Parliament to represent [a rotten borough] while 
London’s million people sent but four”). 
 60. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1133 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]his Court has never provided a sound basis for the one-person, 
one-vote principle. For 50 years, the Court has struggled to define what right that 
principle protects.”); Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in 
Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2002) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote jurisprudence as “doctrinally 
incoherent, plagued with inconsistencies, and marked by a rigid preference for 
mechanical proxies”); id. at 1441 (criticizing one-person, one-vote doctrine for 
“rigidity” that “deprive[s] the Court of the discretion to make nuanced judgments 
regarding application of the equality norm”); see also Sanford Levinson, One 
Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1274 
(2002) (criticizing the doctrine for “provid[ing] no guidance at all to deciding 
which persons in the first place will be admitted to the franchise”). 




Reynolds and Wesberry were quite controversial initially, drawing 
vigorous and eloquent dissents from Justice Harlan.61 Reynolds was the 
more controversial of the two decisions because it invalidated the design 
of state governments, thus raising federalism concerns that some 
considered grave.62 Members of Congress responded to the decisions by 
introducing constitutional amendments to overturn them, a position 
embraced by the Republican party in its 1964 platform.63 Despite this 
ineffectual and short-lived resistance, one-person, one-vote has now 
become an uncontested cornerstone of the constitutional canon and a 
widely accepted principle of democratic legitimacy.64 The Supreme Court 
has extended the doctrine to almost all elections and has shown no appetite 
for backtracking from it.65 The political branches now support Reynolds 
and its progeny unequivocally.66 Majoritarianism, therefore, enjoys broad 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Wesberry, 
376 U.S. at 41–42 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he language of Art. I, §§ 2 and 4, 
the surrounding text, and the relevant history are all in strong and consistent direct 
contradiction of the Court’s holding.”). 
 62. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 624 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“These decisions 
. . . cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism.”). 
 63. Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One-Person, One-Vote, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 213, 223 (2003) (discussing “serious attempts to amend the 
Constitution and to restrict federal-court review of state reapportionment” 
immediately after Reynolds and Wesberry). 
 64. Id. (noting that state legislatures and Congress acceded to the one-person, 
one-vote decisions by the early 1970s). 
 65. See id. at 214, 224 (describing one-person, one-vote as one of “least 
controversial aspects of the right to vote” that enjoys “unreflective acceptance[]”). 
 66. Two fairly recent examples stand out. First, in the Supreme Court’s most 
recent foray into one-person, one-vote, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016), 
not one state attorney general or other elected politician of any party filed an 
amicus brief arguing that Reynolds should be overturned. By contrast, a bipartisan 
group of 20 state attorneys general filed an amicus brief embracing Reynolds. See 
Brief for the States of New York, Alaska et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940), 2015 WL 5719576, at *26–
27. Second, when it was revealed during Samuel Alito’s Supreme Court 
confirmation process that he had questioned the Warren Court’s one-person, one-
vote cases when applying for a government job in the 1980s, the outcry was 
widespread, including from conservative Republicans in the Senate. To dampen 
the controversy, Alito quickly made clear that he considered one-person, one-vote 
a “bedrock principle” of constitutional jurisprudence. See Jo Becker, Alito’s 
Stance on One Man, One Vote is Debated, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/24/AR200511 
2400716.html [https://perma.cc/A4EN-AWSY]. 




support in American political culture despite the egregious exception of 
the Senate. 
B. Partisan Fairness 
One-person, one-vote is necessary for lawmakers to represent the 
median voter, but it is not sufficient. In a district-based legislative system, 
one-person, one-vote may prove hollow at translating votes into legislative 
seats. The goal of any political party is to win power, not votes. In a two-
party system, if a party consistently obtains more votes yet cannot obtain 
more seats—and, hence, power—than its opponent, the system is said to 
suffer from partisan bias.67 Without a reasonable rate of partisan symmetry 
in the seats-to-votes ratio, a government cannot legitimately represent the 
majority.68  
A substantial partisan bias in the seats-to-votes ratio occurs when one 
party wastes more votes than the other by winning more races more 
lopsidedly.69 By contrast, in a multi-member, non-district slate election 
with proportional representation, partisan conversion is perfect in that a 
                                                                                                             
 67. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering 
and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 835 (2015) (“Partisan bias refers to 
the divergence in the share of seats that each party would win given the same share . . 
. of the statewide vote.”). 
 68. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist 
Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 669, 673 (2013) (noting that partisan fairness is 
“virtually a consensus position of the [political science] community”) (quoting 
Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial 
Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6 
(2007)) (citing Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through 
Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 554 (1994)) (“The vast 
majority of American political scientists have adopted the normative position that 
healthy representative democracies have low levels of partisan bias . . . .”). 
 69. Bernard Grofman et al., An Integrated Perspective on the Three Potential 
Sources of Partisan Bias: Malapportionment, Turnout Differences, and the 
Geographic Distribution of Party Vote Shares, 16 ELECTORAL STUD. 457, 458 
(1997) (“[I]f one party wins most of its seats by disproportionately large vote 
shares and loses most of the seats it loses by relatively narrow vote shares, while 
the reverse is true for the other party (or parties), then partisan bias exists against 
the first party.”); League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 
U.S. 399, 466 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting 
that partisan symmetry, whereby a party “receiv[ing] the same fraction of 
legislative seats for a particular vote percentage as the other party would receive 
if it had received the same percentage, . . . is widely accepted by scholars as 
providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems”). 




party that wins 43% of the votes receives 43% of the seats. With 
reasonably accurate party labeling, perfect or nearly perfect partisan 
conversion helps ensure that a legislature more accurately reflects the 
views of the majority. Many prominent political scientists have criticized 
first-past-the-post systems as nonmajoritarian, particularly in contrast to 
proportional representation systems.70 Few nations that use proportional 
representation do so “perfectly.” Many require that candidates or parties 
win a minimum percentage of the vote—for example, 5%—to win any 
seats, which can lead to a substantial percentage of votes being wasted on 
small parties.71 Also, many nations with proportional representation 
implement it through subnational elections, which can lead to divergence 
between the national legislature’s seat count and the overall vote count.72 
Contrasting proportional representation and the American system in depth 
is not necessary here, however, as the goal is to show only that the system 
in the United States works in a distinctly anti-urban way. 
Similar to one-person, one-vote, partisan fairness has a firm basis in 
modern constitutional jurisprudence, with a majority of the Supreme Court 
recognizing that extreme partisan gerrymandering would violate the 
Constitution.73 As compared to one-person, one-vote, however, the Court 
has been more reluctant to intervene directly to prevent partisan 
gerrymandering. To date the Court has never found unconstitutional a 
districting plan on the basis of extreme political—that is, non-racial—
gerrymandering, although it has not ruled out the possibility of such a claim 
                                                                                                             
 70. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION? 103, 109 (2001) [hereinafter, HOW DEMOCRATIC?]; G. BINGHAM 
POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY (2000) (concluding 
that proportional representation better implements views of majority than first-
past-the-post systems). 
 71. Id. at 103, 109; see also Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Election Inversions, 
Coalitions and Proportional Representation: Examples of Voting Paradoxes in 
Danish Government Formations, 36 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUDS. 121, 124–25 
(2013) (discussing the “Threshold Paradox”). 
 72. Kurrild-Klitgaard, supra note 71, at 127 (discussing the “Federal 
Paradox”). 
 73. See Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 
2658 (quoting Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)) (“‘[P]artisan 
gerrymanders,’ this Court has recognized, ‘[are incompatible] with democratic 
principles.’”). In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court rooted the prohibition on extreme 
political gerrymandering in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 478 U.S. 109, 123–25 (1986). In subsequent cases, litigants and 
members of the Court have raised Article I or the First Amendment as potential 
bases for political gerrymandering claims. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (invoking the First Amendment). 




succeeding.74 Recently, the Court sustained against constitutional attack the 
choice of Arizona’s voters to establish an independent redistricting 
commission.75 Although the decision does not compel states that use 
partisan districting to adopt a more neutral, nonpolitical system, it may 
provide some momentum to the emerging effort to depoliticize districting, 
particularly in states with direct democracy.76 Currently, approximately one-
fifth of states grant non- or bipartisan commissions either an advisory or 
binding role in drawing district lines in an attempt to reduce partisan 
gerrymandering.77 In his recent, and last, State of the Union speech, 
President Obama also inveighed against gerrymandering and urged more 
reform of the districting process.78 
                                                                                                             
 74. In the three most prominent Supreme Court cases raising the issue of 
partisan gerrymandering as a constitutional violation—LULAC, Vieth, and 
Davis—the Court has split sharply. In some cases, a minority of justices would 
have invalidated the political gerrymanders presented as unconstitutional. E.g., 
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(two justices finding unconstitutional political gerrymander); Davis, 478 U.S. at 
161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). In Vieth, by 
contrast, a high of four justices would have held that such claims are by their 
nature nonjusticiable. 541 U.S. at 271 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 75. See Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. 2652. 
 76. See The Supreme Court — Leading Cases: Constitutional Law Ariz. State 
Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 129 HARV. L. REV. 181, 196–97 
(2015) (“With independent commissions now bearing the Court’s seal of 
constitutional approval, redistricting-reform activists may seek their 
implementation in additional states — especially those in which the people are 
delegated legislative authority by their state constitutions.”); Peter Miller & 
Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637, 642 (2013) (noting that states with direct democracy 
have been at the forefront of districting reform). 
 77. See Ariz. State Leg., 135 S. Ct. at 2662 nn.6–9 (citing commissions in 
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, Washington, California, Iowa, Ohio, 
Maine, Connecticut, and Indiana); see also League of Women Voters of Fla. v. 
Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 369 (Fla. 2015) (invalidating districting plan on the basis 
of the Fair Districts Amendment to the Florida constitution, FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 
20, which was enacted by the voters in 2010 and prohibits redistricting “with the 
‘intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent’”). 
 78. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack- 
obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/6PHY-
ABRD] (“[W]e’ve got to end the practice of drawing our congressional districts so that 
politicians can pick their voters, and not the other way around. Let a bipartisan group do 
it.”).  




To treat the ideological views, as opposed to partisan preferences, of 
all voters equally, even one-person, one-vote and partisan fairness may not 
be enough.79 As Rodden demonstrates, a system may be fair to both 
parties, but because of the concentration of left-leaning voters in urban 
districts, their preferred political party in a two-party system will win a 
majority only by running more conservative candidates in moderate 
suburban and exurban districts.80 Even when they win a seat majority, the 
so-called “left-leaning” party will actually be quite ideologically incoherent 
because of the compromises necessary to elect a majority.81 As an example 
of such an unwieldy coalition, Rodden cites the post-World-War-II 
Democrats in Congress.82 Another good example might be the Democratic 
majority in the U.S. House from 2007 to 2011, which included many “Blue 
Dogs” from swing districts who were wary of health care reform and climate 
change legislation.83 
This Article does not include ideological fairness as an explicit 
normative premise for several reasons. First, measuring “ideology,” as 
opposed to partisan affinity as articulated through voting, is more difficult 
and issue-dependent. Second, the increased homogenization within each 
of the two major parties recently renders intra-party ideological disunity 
less relevant now than in years past.84 Third, much of the ideological bias 
in the United States Senate stems from the violation of one-person, one-
vote, which is already considered in this analysis. It is important to keep 
ideological fairness in mind, however, and the issue is addressed herein 
where particularly relevant.85 
                                                                                                             
 79. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 283, 307 (2014) (“For the will of the people actually to be authoritative, 
representatives should share not only median voters’ partisan preferences but also 
their policy preferences—that is, their general political ideologies as well as their 
views on more specific policy matters.”). 
 80. Rodden, supra note 5, at 138. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 166–68. 
 83. See, e.g., Ari Berman, Opinion, Boot the Blue Dogs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/opinion/24berman.html [https://perma 
.cc/YJ67-EDCZ] (noting that “[c]onservative Democrats . . . opposed key elements of 
. . . [President Obama’s] agenda”). 
 84. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1086–87. 
 85. One-person, one-vote and partisan or ideological fairness are hardly 
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III. THE SENATE AND THE NATIONAL URBAN DISADVANTAGE 
Consistent with the normative framework outlined in Part II, this Part 
explains how the composition of the United States Senate contributes 
substantially to the urban disadvantage in the national lawmaking process. 
By giving each state equal suffrage, regardless of population, the United 
States Senate violates the principle of one-person, one-vote more 
egregiously than almost any national legislative body in the world.86 When 
the Constitution was written, the most populous state had 11 times more 
people than the least populous state.87 Now the greatest disparity is more 
than six times that, with California’s population exceeding Wyoming’s by 
a factor of 66 to 1. Add in Washington, D.C.’s complete lack of Senate 
representation, and the malapportionment is even worse: Wyoming’s 
583,000 people get two votes, and the capital’s 646,000 get zero.88 
Table 1 lists states in order of population and demonstrates their 
degree of over- or underrepresentation in a few different ways, including 
how many representatives a state would have in a hypothetical 1000-
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promise of one-person, one-vote). 
 86. See Adam Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout in Growing Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03 
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50; Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, in 
FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES 448 tbl.16.1 (Ugo M. Amoretti & 
Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004) (ranking the United States third worst, after Argentina 
and Brazil, on measures of representational inequality of upper house chambers). 
 87. When comparing states in terms of population, the Article occasionally 
refers to the most populous as the “largest” and the least populous as the 
“smallest.” Unless specifically indicated, such labels do not refer to geographic 
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 88. The violation of democratic ideals potentially extends further to the five 
major United States territories of Guam, Northern Marianas Islands, Puerto Rico, 
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Land That Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J. 1525, 1527 (2008) 
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person senate if seats were allocated on the basis of population, as opposed 
to the current regime where each state would get 20 seats. 
 







% of Senate - 
% of U.S. 
Log of representation 
in current Senate 
Seats in 1000-
person Senate on 
1P1V 
CA  38,802,500  12.2% -10.19% 0.62 122 
TX  26,956,958  8.5% -6.47% 0.67 85 
FL  19,893,297  6.3% -4.25% 0.72 63 
NY  19,746,227  6.2% -4.21% 0.73 62 
IL  12,880,580  4.0% -2.05% 0.81 40 
PA  12,787,209  4.0% -2.02% 0.81 40 
OH  11,594,163  3.6% -1.64% 0.83 36 
GA  10,097,343  3.2% -1.17% 0.87 32 
NC  9,943,964  3.1% -1.13% 0.87 31 
MI  9,909,877  3.1% -1.11% 0.87 31 
NJ  8,938,175  2.8% -0.81% 0.90 28 
VA  8,326,289  2.6% -0.62% 0.92 26 
WA  7,061,530  2.2% -0.22% 0.97 22 
MA  6,745,408  2.1% -0.12% 0.98 21 
AZ  6,731,484  2.1% -0.12% 0.98 21 
IN  6,596,855  2.1% -0.07% 0.99 21 
TN  6,549,352  2.1% -0.06% 0.99 21 
MO  6,063,589  1.9% 0.09% 1.02 19 
MD  5,976,407  1.9% 0.12% 1.02 19 
WI  5,757,564  1.8% 0.19% 1.03 18 
MN  5,457,173  1.7% 0.28% 1.05 17 
CO  5,355,866  1.7% 0.32% 1.06 17 
AL  4,849,377  1.5% 0.48% 1.10 15 
SC  4,832,482  1.5% 0.48% 1.10 15 
LA  4,649,676  1.5% 0.54% 1.12 15 
KY  4,413,457  1.4% 0.61% 1.14 14 
OR  3,970,239  1.2% 0.75% 1.19 12 
OK  3,878,051  1.2% 0.78% 1.20 12 
CT  3,596,677  1.1% 0.87% 1.24 11 
IA  3,107,126  1.0% 1.02% 1.31 10 
MS  2,994,079  0.9% 1.06% 1.34 9 
AR  2,966,369  0.9% 1.07% 1.34 9 
UT  2,942,902  0.9% 1.08% 1.35 9 
KS  2,904,021  0.9% 1.09% 1.35 9 
NV  2,839,099  0.9% 1.11% 1.37 9 
NM  2,085,572  0.7% 1.34% 1.59 7 
NE  1,881,503  0.6% 1.41% 1.69 6 
WV  1,850,326  0.6% 1.42% 1.70 6 
ID  1,634,464  0.5% 1.49% 1.83 5 
HI  1,419,561  0.4% 1.55% 2.00 4 
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/2014/ [https://perma.cc/T9AF-FU34] (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 
 90. Excluding Washington, D.C. and other territories. 




ME  1,330,089  0.4% 1.58% 2.09 4 
NH  1,326,813  0.4% 1.58% 2.10 4 
RI  1,055,173  0.3% 1.67% 2.50 3 
MT  1,023,579  0.3% 1.68% 2.56 3 
DE  935,614  0.3% 1.71% 2.78 3 
SD  853,175  0.3% 1.73% 3.04 3 
ND  739,482  0.2% 1.77% 3.55 2 
AK  736,732  0.2% 1.77% 3.57 2 
VT  626,562  0.2% 1.80% 4.42 2 
WY  584,153  0.2% 1.82% 4.93 2 
 
If partisan and ideological preferences were evenly distributed 
throughout the nation, the Senate’s malapportionment might reflect itself 
only through overrepresented states receiving a higher distribution of “pork” 
than underrepresented states, a consequence that many commentators have 
highlighted.91 Although this is no doubt one harm, it is not the primary harm, 
nor is it as benign as it seems because divorcing spending from ideological 
priorities is impossible. 
Consider transportation funding. Although all regions prefer more 
money for their needs, whether to prioritize private automobile travel over 
mass transit, cycling, and walking is a highly contested, ideologically 
charged issue. If preferences regarding transportation were evenly 
distributed throughout the nation, the only harm resulting from the 
Senate’s malapportionment would be that overrepresented states would 
receive more money to spend on the agreed-upon mix. But because 
preferences for transportation policy are not evenly distributed—smaller, 
overrepresented states generally prefer spending on highways over mass 
transit, which is preferred more by underrepresented states—the overall 
spending priorities of the federal government are distorted to support 
highway spending more than they would if the Senate complied with one-
person, one-vote. The 2015 fatal Amtrak crash in Philadelphia highlighted 
this issue vividly: the United States spends less on rail safety than almost 
any other advanced nation in the world.92 There is little doubt that the 
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Senate’s overrepresentation of rural states that have no passenger rail, such 
as Wyoming and South Dakota, has played a role in this allocative 
decision.93 By contrast, the “Northeast Corridor”—where Amtrak train 
service might benefit most from increased spending—is underrepresented.94 
In addition to spending decisions, ideological and political preferences 
more generally correlate significantly with state size and population density. 
The Senate’s malapportionment greatly amplifies the power of residents of 
rural, less densely populated states that more often vote Republican in 
presidential elections and can be classified as more ideologically 
“conservative” on a number of issues. Their overrepresentation helps ensure 
that bills disliked by rural, conservative voters have little chance of passing, 
even if the American public supports them. To be sure, the Senate’s small-
state amplification does not always work in favor of rural, Republican-
leaning voters. Some relatively urban or left-leaning small states like 
Rhode Island, Delaware, Hawaii, and Vermont also benefit. But on 
balance, the benefit accrues to the more rural states whose voters lean right 
on a number of key issues. 
The near-routine use of the filibuster in the last decade, which requires 
that bills clear a 60-vote threshold to move forward, and the lack of 
representation for Washington, D.C., gives senators representing a very 
small percentage of the American public the power to kill legislation 
unilaterally.95 In theory, it is possible for senators representing less than 
11% of the American population to block a bill.96 A system that requires 
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UR2H] (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) (showing which states lack Amtrak service), 
with Table 2 (demonstrating overrepresentation of states like Wyoming and South 
Dakota in Senate).  
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 95. See Olympia J. Snowe, The Effect of Modern Partisanship on Legislative 
Effectiveness in the 112th Congress, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 29–30 (2013) 
(noting the significant increase in the use of the filibuster in recent Congresses). 
 96. This figure is calculated by adding up the populations of the smallest 20 
states plus one-half of the population of the 21st-smallest state (for a total of 




support from the representatives of almost 90% of the American public to 
move legislation forward is highly likely to stifle the majority. For treaty 
ratification and constitutional amendments, the threshold for Senate 
passage is even higher, requiring two-thirds, or 67 senators. Therefore, 34 
senators, who might represent a mere 8.4% of the total population, can 
block a treaty or amendment.97 
A. Recent Examples of the Senate’s Malapportionment Effect 
Some prominent votes in recent years demonstrate that the Senate’s 
malapportionment problem is not just hypothetical. Consider the vote in 
April 2013, months after the Newtown school shooting, to expand 
background checks for firearms purchases. Despite polls showing that 
more than 90% of the American public supported the bill, the Senate 
“defeated” the bill 54 to 46; that is, 54 senators voted in favor, but not 
enough to clear the 60-vote filibuster threshold.98 When assessed from the 
perspective of one-person, one-vote, however, the senators in favor of the 
bill represented 63% of the American public, whereas the senators voting 
against represented a mere 37%.99 
Another recent vote illustrating the ideological skewing that results 
from the Senate’s malapportionment was the legislative response to the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision interpreting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.100 A 
proposal to overturn the Court’s reading of RFRA—also known as the Not 
My Boss’s Business Act—“failed” in the Senate by a vote of 56 to 43.101 
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[https://perma.cc/M3UV-T9Y2]. See also infra Appendix, Table 4.  
 100. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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Interference Act.” See U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote No. 228 (July 16, 2014), 113th 




The senators supporting RFRA represented 61% of the nation’s population 
while the senators in opposition represented 39%. Although increased 
access to birth control is not an obvious urban issue, the Act likely had 
more support among urban residents given their partisan preferences—the 
Act’s support was overwhelmingly Democratic—and the reduced sway of 
so-called “traditional” religious values in urban areas.102 
Senators vote for or against bills for a number of reasons, among 
which the views of their constituents is just one. Indeed, senators from 13 
states split their votes on the background-check bill, demonstrating that 
viewing senators purely as the “delegates” of their electorates is overly 
simplified. Nonetheless, so long as one accepts that senators are not pure 
“trustees,” the relevance of the views of the senator’s geographic 
constituency cannot be ignored.103 A more subtle explanation of split-state 
votes is that senators represent the views of a potential winning coalition 
in their states. For instance, in certain states there is a possibility of 
assembling a winning coalition on either side of the gun control issue, 
whereas in other states there is not.104 
As evidenced by the background-check bill, the Senate’s 
malapportionment transcends partisanship. Although most Democrats 
supported the bill, four did not.105 All four Democratic “no” votes came 
from rural states vastly overrepresented in the Senate: Alaska, Arkansas, 
Montana, and North Dakota.106 Four Republicans supported the bill: two 
were from states significantly underrepresented in the Senate—Illinois and 
Pennsylvania—one was from a state significantly overrepresented—
Maine—and one was from a state, Arizona, whose Senate representation 
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Politics, 46 J. POL. 1061, 1065–66 (1984). 
 105. See Senate Roll Call Vote No. 97, supra note 98 (indicating “Nay” votes 
from Baucus (D-MT), Begich (D-AK), Heitkamp (D-ND), and Pryor (D-AR)). 
 106. See id. 




is approximately consistent with its share of the nation’s population.107 On 
issues in which there is a significant urban-rural divide, irrespective of 
partisanship, therefore, the Senate’s malapportionment is still acutely felt.  
The filibuster can amplify the Senate’s malapportionment, as 
demonstrated by the above examples, but it can also neutralize it, at least 
theoretically. It is possible to amass the 60 votes necessary to pass legislation 
from the senators representing the 30 smallest states. Those senators represent 
a mere 24% of the nation’s population. Put differently, if the senators from 
the 20 most populous states plus one senator from the 21st most populous 
state provided the 41 votes for a filibuster, they would represent 77% of the 
nation’s population. The filibuster, therefore, is a double-edged sword with 
respect to the Senate’s countermajoritarianism.108 Indeed, a potential—if 
pollyannish—partial solution to the Senate’s malapportionment would be to 
allow the filibuster to hold only when the filibustering coalition represents a 
significant majority—for example, 55% or 60%—of the national 
population.109 
Empirical analysis of the two most recent decades of Senate votes 
demonstrates that filibuster use has been most countermajoritarian when 
Democrats control the Senate and most majoritarian when Republicans 
control the Senate.110 The propensity of underrepresented urban voters to 
favor the position of the national Democratic party helps explain this 
dynamic. 
Given that the Senate’s malapportionment often combines with the 
filibuster to block the advancement of legislation, the Senate significantly 
privileges the regulatory status quo, particularly if that status quo aligns 
with the preferences of voters in overrepresented states. Hence, it is 
extraordinarily difficult institutionally to enact legislation that derives a 
significant portion of its support from urban voters. The damage includes 
not just the votes that failed, but the many other proposals that never make 
it to the Senate floor or even a committee hearing because leaders know that 
the votes are not there for ultimate passage. Good recent examples include 
a public insurance option as part of the 2009 health care overhaul and 
comprehensive climate change legislation that the House of Representatives 
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passed in 2009.111 The Senate is also the gatekeeper for approving executive 
and judicial nominees by the president. Although the Senate recently eliminated 
the filibuster for votes on many such nominees, its malapportionment may still 
result in a grossly countermajoritarian rejection of a nomination, or even a 
failure to give a nominee a hearing.112 
B. The Relationship Between One-Person, One-Vote and Partisan 
Fairness 
A potential criticism of the methodology used so far to tally the 
percentage of people represented by senators is that it ignores the margin 
by which senators win their seats. In other words, it may be simplistic to 
say that the two senators from California represent 39 million people when 
each won the most recent election with less than 100% of the vote.113 If all 
senators win their elections by the same percentage margins, then this 
point is moot. If, however, the senators in smaller states win by larger 
margins than those in larger states, it is possible that the Senate is more 
effective at representing the mean views of voters nationally than the 
analysis used heretofore would indicate. Indeed, it is at least hypothetically 
possible that the violation of one-person, one-vote might bolster partisan 
fairness. Imagine if Democrats won all seats in the 20 most populous 
states, which represent more than 239 million combined, by 51% to 49%, 
while Republicans won all seats by a combined margin of 88% to 12% in 
                                                                                                             
 111. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns [https://perma.cc/F994-PV 
ND] (explaining how the climate change bill passed by the House in 2010 died in the 
Senate); Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Reject Pair of Public Option Proposals, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/health/policy 
/30health.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XCZ5-AVHZ] (discussing the Senate Finance 
Committee’s narrow defeat of a public option proposal). 
 112. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger “Nuclear” Option; Eliminate Most 




 113. In 2012, for instance, Democrat Dianne Feinstein defeated her 
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the other 30 states. Republicans would therefore enjoy a 60 to 40 senate 
advantage, which would correspond to the total national vote. 
The Senate is a district-based system; each “district” just happens to 
be a state. In any district-based, winner-take-all system, there will be a 
disparity between the national popular vote count for parties and the 
partisan composition of the body. Equipopulous representation by state in 
the Senate may not be the best solution to the problem of 
malapportionment—a national, proportional election might be ideal—but 
it would undoubtedly be much fairer from the standpoint of one-person, 
one-vote than the current system. Moreover, it is not clear that one party 
consistently wins Senate races by higher percentages than the other, so this 
criticism is largely academic. Further, senators undoubtedly moderate 
their positions to reflect their states’ views rather than the views of their 
national party to some extent.114 Hence, a Senate that suffered from no 
partisan imbalance could still very much fail to represent the median voter 
because of the massive violation of one-person, one-vote. As the gun 
control issue demonstrates, on certain issues, the strongly held views of a 
state’s voters can trump those of the national party’s. 
C. Counterarguments for Senate Malapportionment 
A common argument for the status quo is the essentiality of equal 
Senate suffrage to the Founding framework as well as its ability to 
preserve state sovereignty.115 Because this Article proceeds from the 
normative premise that one-person, one-vote is necessary for democratic 
governance, it does not address those arguments in depth. Regardless, 
other scholars have ably rejected such arguments on their own terms: equal 
state suffrage is not necessary to preserve state sovereignty, and 
fundamentally unjust political arrangements can rely only for so long on their 
pragmatic origins as a justification.116 Four additional arguments might be 
offered in defense of the Senate’s malapportionment: first, that it protects 
minorities; second, that the Senate’s past performance demonstrates that 
malapportionment is not a major problem; third, that campaign contributions 
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might counteract the effects of malapportionment; and fourth, that 
malapportionment is of little concern because voters choose to move to or 
stay in underrepresented states. 
1. Minority Protection 
Some scholars defend the Senate’s countermajoritarian composition 
as a means of protecting political minorities. Because this Article proceeds 
from the premise that a majoritarian government is preferable, at least with 
respect to the matters that are constitutionally “on the table” for the 
legislature, minority protection is not necessarily a good thing if it impedes 
the majority’s ability to enact legislation. Regardless, the Senate is an 
extremely poorly designed institution for protecting minority rights in an 
evenhanded or systematic way.117 Because the Senate relies on winner-
take-all elections, one political party could win every Senate election over 
six years 51% to 49% and then control 100% of the seats in the Senate. 
With respect to empowering racial minorities, the Senate has had a paucity 
of such members in its long history, even since passage of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1964.118 Most crucially, insofar as the Senate is 
institutionally designed to protect minorities, it does so only in favor of a 
very particularized popular and geographic minority—residents of low-
population states.119 A Senate that complied with one-person, one-vote 
could protect minorities more evenhandedly and effectively through other 
means, such as by maintaining a filibuster-like supermajority requirement 
for the passage of certain laws. 
2. Past Performance 
Another counterargument is that the Senate has always been 
malapportioned, yet somehow functioned well in the past. Severe 
malfunction caused in no small party by the Senate’s malapportionment, 
however, punctuate the historical record. Before the Civil War, the South’s 
exaggerated representation in the Senate “contributed to Congressional 
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(2010) (discussing paucity of blacks in Senate since the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1964). 
 119. HOW DEMOCRATIC?, supra note 70, at 53–54 (“Why would we want to 
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sterility on the slavery issue.”120 While it is unrealistic to say that the Civil 
War could have been avoided, the much less populous Southern states’ equal 
representation in the Senate allowed them to extract significant pro-slavery 
concessions in the antebellum decades.121 Southern overrepresentation, 
combined with the filibuster, also doomed anti-lynching and other civil rights 
legislation in the first half of the 20th century.122 
Even if one is satisfied with the Senate’s historical record of achievement, 
the current Senate is arguably less representative than prior Senates for two 
reasons. First, as noted above, the disparity between the most and least 
populous states has grown substantially since the founding, and is 
unprecedented in American history. Today the five most populous states 
represent 37% of the national population, while the bottom five states 
represent 1.1%.123 In 1950, the five most populous states amounted to 35% 
of the population,124 and in 1900 they amounted to 34% of the 
population.125 In 1900, the most populous state, New York, would have 
had 97 seats in a 1000-seat Senate apportioned on the basis of population. 
                                                                                                             
 120. Leonard G. Ratner, Reapportionment and the Constitution, 38 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 540, 547 (1964). 
 121. Such concessions were often extracted upon the admission of new states, 
with the South demanding that any increase in free states be balanced by the same 
number of slave states or other significant concessions. See, e.g., JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 67–73 
(2d ed. 1992) (discussing the Great Compromise of 1850, in which Congress 
admitted California as a free state and in exchange, inter alia, passed a more 
stringent Fugitive Slave Act); see also HOW DEMOCRATIC?, supra note 70, at 53 
(discussing how equal representation in the Senate enhanced the South’s power 
and gave it “a veto over any policy affecting slavery”). 
 122. See NAACP History: Anti-Lynching Bill, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org 
/pages/naacp-history-anti-lynching-bill [https://perma.cc/8E36-HCXN] (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2016) (discussing how the anti-lynching Dyer Bill passed the House but 
died in the Senate in the early 1920s); Deleso Alford Washington, Note, Exploring 
the Black Wombman’s Sphere and the Anti-Lynching Crusade of the Early 
Twentieth Century, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 895, 914 (2002) (discussing successful 
filibuster of the Costigan–Wagner anti-lynching bill in May 1935 by a small group 
of Southern senators); see also HOW DEMOCRATIC?, supra note 70, at 53 (“After 
the Civil War, Senators from elsewhere were compelled to accommodate to the 
Southern [senatorial] veto,” which “prevented the country from enacting federal 
laws to protect the most basic human rights of African Americans.”). 
 123. These numbers exclude Washington, D.C. and other territories. See infra 
Appendix, Table 3. 
 124. In 1950, the least populous 5 states still amounted to 1.1% of the population 
of the 48 states. See infra Appendix, Table 7. 
 125. In 1910, the least populous 5 states amounted to just under 1% of the 45 
states. See infra Appendix, Table 6.  




In 1950, the number would have remained the same. By contrast, today 
California would have 122 seats in a 1000-person senate if seats were 
apportioned on the basis of population. 
Moreover, the current geographic dispersion of political views largely 
on a rural–urban split is unprecedented.126 Although past Senates were 
undoubtedly riven by sectional disputes in which certain geographical 
blocs exercised disproportionate power, many of today’s most prominent 
disputes allow blocs of senators from largely rural states—from different 
sections of the country—to band together to block legislation important to 
the urban population. For instance, opposition to the background-check 
bill came from all corners of the nation.127 
3. Campaign Money as Ameliorative 
In part due to recent Supreme Court decisions,128 the ability of wealthy 
private individuals, corporations, and unions to influence the political 
process has perhaps never been greater.129 As a result, the “democracy” 
that the Senate’s malapportionment allegedly disrupts might not be so 
democratic after all. Moneyed interests ensure that senators conform to big 
donors’ priorities regardless of whether a senator represents 600,000 or 30 
million people. Moreover, a disproportionate share of the money 
contributed to political races across the nation comes from the very populous 
cities—Los Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, and Dallas—that are 
most hurt by the Senate’s violation of one-person, one-vote.130 Perhaps, 
                                                                                                             
 126. See Scala et al., supra note 11. 
 127. See Senate Roll Call Vote No. 97, supra note 98.  
 128. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating under the First 
Amendment federal restrictions on the cumulative donations an individual may 
make to Congressional campaign committees); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010) (invalidating restrictions on independent campaign expenditures by 
corporations and labor unions under the First Amendment); see also 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (extending 
Citizens United to invalidate under the First Amendment federal limits on how 
much money an individual could contribute to a nonprofit organization that made 
independent expenditures to influence campaigns). 
 129. See MARIAN CURRINDER, MONEY IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGN FUNDS AND 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTY POLITICS 200 (2009) (“As money has become central to 
the way parties compete for majority control [in Congress], partisan polarization 
and the influence of wealthy interests have intensified.”). 
 130. Politicians & Elections, Top Metro Areas 2014, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topmetro.php [https://perma.cc/Q3UF-CP 
66] (last visited Sept. 2, 2016) (demonstrating concentration of candidate and 




therefore, money can partially ameliorate the Senate’s violation of one-
person, one-vote. 
The money argument is an unsatisfactory defense of the Senate’s 
malapportionment, as money can only ameliorate the violation of one-
person, one-vote if our democratic process remains corrupted by money.131 
Moreover, the ideological views promoted by those from Los Angeles and 
New York City who spend significant sums to influence the political 
process often diverge widely from the median views of those cities’ 
residents. For instance, in the 2012 presidential election, voters in 
Manhattan preferred Obama to Romney by 84% to 15%; among total 
dollars donated to each candidate from borough residents, Obama “won” 
by 68% to 32%.132 Thus, big donors are affecting the political process in a 
manner that magnifies their own views, rather than those of the median 
voter in their city or region.133 Further, while it is self-evident that money 
significantly affects the political process,134 it can only go so far with 
respect to hot-button issues. However much billionaire former New York 
City mayor Michael Bloomberg might prefer more stringent gun control, 
                                                                                                             
PAC contributions in 2014 national elections from donors in major metro areas, 
such as New York City, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Chicago). 
 131. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
 132. See 2012 Presidential Campaign Finance, FED. ELEC. COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do;jsessionid=68966DCCD42B05F48
355222D759DB876.worker1 [https://perma.cc/9KFC-MBP3] (select the 2012 
election cycle, click through to “New York,” and zip code “100xx”) (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2016). 
 133. See Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of 
Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013), http://faculty.wcas.north 
western.edu/~jnd260/cab/CAB2012%20-%20Page1.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2DU-
5G3F]; Filipe R. Campante, Redistribution in a Model of Voting and Campaign 
Contributions, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 646, 647 (2011) (“When [campaign] contributions 
are important, parties are moved to adopt platforms to attract the wealthy.”); see 
generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012) (documenting how the American 
political system is increasingly more responsive to the different policy preferences 
of the affluent). 
 134. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 522 (2007) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (observing that the “documented threats to electoral integrity . . . 
posed by large sums of money from corporate or union treasuries” are “obvious 
to any voter”). 




millions in campaign contributions or independent expenditures will affect 
certain senators’ votes only so much.135 
4. Mobility and Voluntary Waiver 
Given that Americans appear to be gravitating to locations in part based 
on an area’s political leanings, one might argue that those moving to vastly 
underrepresented states like New York, Texas, or California are voluntarily 
waiving a better representation ratio in the Senate. This argument is 
intriguing, but must be rejected for two reasons. First, among all the factors 
an individual takes into account when moving, representation in the Senate 
likely ranks quite low on the list. Job opportunities, family, cost of living, 
recreation, and related factors all play a much larger role in relocation 
decisions.136 Moreover, a person might move to an underrepresented city 
like New York or San Francisco precisely because of frustration over the 
political culture in the more overrepresented state and in the nation at large, 
and seek a local political culture more consistent with personal preferences. 
Second, as with any valuable political right, the right to equal representation 
that one-person, one-vote embodies should be considered un-waivable. 
Political equality is undoubtedly as important as the rights protected from a 
supposedly “voluntary” waiver by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
such as free speech, private property ownership, and free exercise of 
religion.137 
                                                                                                             
 135. See Dan Friedman, Wins and Losses for Bloomberg Candidates and 
Causes on Tuesday, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Nov. 5, 2014, 2:53 AM), http://www 
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HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); cf. Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, 
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In sum, the U.S. Senate’s egregious violation of one-person, one-vote 
works to the distinct detriment of voters in highly populous states with major 
metropolitan areas. The Senate’s malapportionment results not just in warped 
federal spending priorities, but also in the death—or impossibility ab initio—
of numerous regulatory measures that enjoy strong support from urban 
populations. 
IV. THE URBAN DISADVANTAGE IN THE U.S. HOUSE: PARTISAN BIAS 
Although the Senate skews federal priorities away from urban 
preferences in a massive, obvious, and nearly permanent way, the House 
of Representatives now does so in a subtler and more contingent manner 
that is nonetheless significant. As currently composed, and based on 
current population distributions, the House suffers from substantial 
partisan bias in its seats-to-vote ratio in a manner that mutes the voice of 
urban America. Before explaining this phenomenon in detail, it is helpful 
to understand how the House does and does not comply with one-person, 
one-vote. 
Since Wesberry, all House districts within a state must be apportioned 
equally. The requirement that every state have at least one representative,138 
combined with the presumed prohibition of House districts crossing state 
lines,139 nonetheless leads to some disparity in House district populations.140 
Unlike the Senate’s institutional bias, however, the rounding errors that 
result from House apportionment do not systematically favor small states. 
Because a state needs more than 1.5 times the average district population to 
receive two representatives, a state with, for example, 900,000 people will 
receive only one representative when the average House district population 
nationally is 713,000.141 The House, therefore, roughly complies with one-
                                                                                                             
 138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“[E]ach State shall have at Least one 
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 139. Article I does not state this requirement clearly; it is only implicit in the 
text and recognized by continuous historical practice. See U.S. Dep’t of 
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person, one-vote, even if the smaller the state, the more likely its district 
populations stray—up or down—from the national mean.142 
With respect to the seats-to-vote ratio, however, the House now suffers 
from significant partisan bias in favor of Republicans, and to the detriment 
of urban voters’ preferences. The 2012 House election acutely 
demonstrated this bias: Democratic House candidates received 1.4 million 
more votes than Republican House candidates, yet Republicans 
comfortably retained their majority in the chamber by a count of 234 to 
201.143 Stated differently, although the Democrats defeated Republicans 
48.8% to 47.6% nationally, Republicans won the seat count 54% to 46%. 
The 2012 results are not anomalous, but rather are emblematic of a 
structural bias in U.S. House elections in favor of Republicans over the 
last two or three decades. For instance, in 1996, just as in 2012, 
Republicans won a majority of House seats while amassing fewer votes 
than Democrats.144 The U.S. House elections in 1996 and 2012 were the 
only ones in the last 50 years in which either party won a seat majority 
while losing the popular vote to the other party.145 In addition to 
occasionally winning the House majority despite losing the popular vote, 
Republicans experience greater proportional gains in seats to their vote 
share when they outpoll Democrats.146  
 
                                                                                                             
more on the deviation of one-person, one-vote due to interstate apportionment, see 
Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 140, at 90–94. The Supreme Court unanimously 
upheld Congress’s choice of the “equal proportions” method against a challenge that 
it was inconsistent with Article I, Section 2. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 
503 U.S. 442, 465–66 (1992). 
 142. See Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 140, at 93 & fig.2.; see also ROYCE 
CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41584, HOUSE APPORTIONMENT 2012: 
STATES GAINING, LOSING, AND ON THE MARGIN 2, tbl.1 (2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41584.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN62-QGF6].  
 143. KAREN L. HAAS, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOV. 6, 2012 
(2013), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2012election/ [https: 
//perma.cc/KPC4-STHC]. 
 144. See Michael P. McDonald, Mechanical Effects of Duverger’s Law in the 
USA, in DUVERGER’S LAW OF PLURALITY VOTING 76 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 
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Seat % - 
vote % for 
seat victor 
Seat % - 
vote % for 
seat loser 
2006 44.3 52.3 202 233 46.4 53.6 1.3  2.1 
2008 42.6 53.2 178 257 40.9 59.1 5.9 -1.7 
2010 51.7 44.9 242 193 55.6 44.4 3.9 -0.5 
2012 47.6 48.8 234 201 53.8 46.2 6.2 -2.6 
2014 50.9 45.3 247 188 56.8 43.2 5.9 -2.1 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the last five House elections. The first 
apparent trend is that Democrats need a much higher national vote 
percentage than Republicans to obtain the same number of seats. For 
instance, in 2006, Democrats outpolled Republicans 52.3% to 44.3%, yet 
gained “only” a 233 to 202 majority, whereas in 2010, Republicans 
outpolled Democrats by less—51.7% to 44.9%—yet gained a more 
substantial 242 to 193 majority. Second, Republicans have cemented their 
gains from incumbency obtained in their 2010 win. In addition to winning 
the House comfortably in 2012 despite losing the national popular vote, 
they won more seats in 2014 with less of the national popular vote—and 
by a smaller margin—than in 2010.  
The national vote count is necessarily of limited value. Voters might 
prefer the national platform of one party, but vote for a candidate of a 
different party because they like the candidate personally, agree with the 
candidate’s own political views that diverge from the party’s, or appreciate 
the candidate’s record of constituent service. Further, House elections are 
battled out district by district. Competitive races draw the best candidates 
and attract the most campaign contributions and independent 
expenditures.147 If Democrats and Republicans in 2012 had reason to care 
about their national vote count performance, they would have spent money 
trying to reach voters in numerous districts that each instead ceded as 
noncompetitive.148 
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Even accepting that “everything would be different” if we had a 
national slate election for the House, the national popular results still speak 
volumes. Most Americans intuitively understand that a vote for the district 
candidate is a vote for the national party’s agenda.149 This association is 
more pronounced in presidential election years when each party’s 
standard-bearer might have a coattail effect on candidates for federal 
office down the ballot.150 Moreover, in a national slate election, 
Republican candidates would be likely to take more moderate political 
positions closer to the views of urban voters. That they feel no need to do 
so is evidence of the profound disadvantage from which densely populated 
areas suffer in U.S. House elections.151 
Given that urban areas overwhelmingly support Democratic 
candidates in House and other federal elections, partisan bias in favor of 
Republican House candidates works to the disadvantage of urban voters.152 
The three primary contributors to this emerging systematic bias are partisan 
gerrymandering, the presumed constitutional prohibition on House districts 
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crossing state lines, and the unintentional effects of the current geographical 
distribution of voter preferences—so-called “unintentional gerrymandering.”  
A. Partisan Gerrymandering 
The United States is unique in that political officials have traditionally 
controlled districting.153 Using this power, the political party in charge of 
districting will often try to draw a map to its advantage. Such 
gerrymandering is as old as the Republic, but computer mapping and other 
technological advances have allowed parties to employ it with 
unprecedented levels of sophistication in recent years.154 Following the 
censuses of 2000 and 2010, many Republican-controlled state legislatures 
engaged in intense gerrymandering of state legislative and House seats. 
Scholars and advocacy groups have demonstrated how the 2010 
gerrymandering in key large states contributed significantly to the 
Republicans’ 2012 House victory.155 In these states, listed in Table 3, 
Republicans’ seat share greatly outpaced their vote share. In states like 
Michigan, North Carolina, and Ohio, Republicans lost the statewide 
popular vote for House candidates yet comfortably won the majority of the 
state’s House seats. 
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R seat % - vote % 
margin 
FL 52 46 17 10 63 11 
MI 46 51 9 5 64 18 
NC 49 51 9 4 69 20 
OH 51 47 12 4 75 24 
PA 49 51 13 5 72 23 
VA 50 48 8 3 73 23 
IN 53 45 7 2 78 25 
 
Were partisan gerrymandering the only explanation for the Republican 
advantage in 2012 as cemented by incumbency in 2014, urban areas might 
not be at a permanent disadvantage. A shift in state legislature control in 
2020 could, in theory, reverse the damage for urban-favored Democrats. 
However, state legislative districts too have been gerrymandered in favor of 
Republicans in many states, thus creating a feedback loop that cannot be 
broken without removing the politics from districting.156 It is natural to look 
to the growing movement to reduce political control of districting as a means 
of breaking this vicious cycle.157 The built-in Republican advantage in the 
U.S. House, however, is so strong that even the elimination of partisan 
gerrymandering is unlikely to erase it. 
B. Prohibition on Districts Crossing State Lines 
The presumed prohibition on House districts crossing state lines leads 
Democrats to waste proportionally more votes in smaller states. This is so 
because the fewer seats in a state, the more substantial the expected seats–
vote margin. Those states with single or few seats are more likely to elect 
Republicans, thus amplifying Republican strength because of the inevitably 
larger seat–vote spread in small states. For instance, in a state with only one 
representative, a candidate receiving 51% of the vote, as compared to his 
opponent’s 49%, wins 100% of the seats in the state, thereby leading to a 
49% margin. Indeed, in both 2012 and 2014, the House margin in single-
seat states was significant. As shown in Table 4, in the seven states with 
single seats, Republicans won the same five of seven in 2012 and 2014. 
Republicans thus won 71% of seats in these states despite winning only 
50.5% and 53% of the vote, respectively, in each year. Democrats, by 
contrast, won a mere 29% of the seats despite winning 46% and 43% of the 
vote. 
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TABLE 4 - 2012 AND 2014 U.S. HOUSE RESULTS 
 IN ONE-SEAT STATES 
 
U.S. House 2012 
 R D Other Total Win % 
AK  185,296   82,927   21,581   289,804  64% 
DE  129,757   249,933   8,369   388,059  64% 
MT  255,468   204,939   19,333   479,740  53% 
ND  173,433   131,869   10,922   316,224  55% 
SD  207,640   153,789  0  361,429  57% 
VT  67,543   208,600   13,610   289,753  72% 
WY  166,452   57,573   17,596   241,621  69% 
Total  1,185,589   1,089,630   91,411   2,366,630  50% 
U.S. House 2014 
 R D Other Total Win % 
AK  142,572   114,602   22,567   279,741  51% 
DE  85,146   137,251   9,220   231,617  59% 
MT  201,436   146,474   15,105   363,015  55% 
ND  138,100   95,678   14,892   248,670  56% 
SD  183,834   92,485  0  276,319  67% 
VT  59,432   123,349   8,723   191,504  64% 
WY  113,038   37,803   14,259   165,100  68% 
Total  923,558   747,642   84,766   1,755,966  53% 
 
The four two-seat states—Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, and New Hampshire—
as a whole occasionally lean more Democratic. In 2012, for instance, 
Democrats’ total vote share in two-seat states was 51% as compared to 
Republicans’ 46%, yet Democrats won six of eight, or 75%, of the seats. In 
2014, by contrast, the Democrats again won the total vote in two-seat states 
by 51% to 46%, but this time tied the Republicans at only four seats apiece.158 
 
TABLE 5 - 2012 U.S. HOUSE RESULTS IN TWO-SEAT STATES 
 
State   R vote   D vote   Other 
 Total    
vote 











HI   137,531   265,327   34,301   437,159  31.5  60.7  0  2 -31.5 
ID   406,814   208,297   20,107   635,218  64  32.8  2  0 36 
ME   265,982   427,819     0   693,801  38.3  61.7  0  2 -38.3 
NH   311,636   340,925   29,855   682,416  45.7 50  0  2 -45.7 
Total  1,121,963  1,242,368   84,263  2,448,594  45.8  50.7  2  6 -20.8 
 
  
                                                                                                             
 158. See infra Table 6. A seat in each of Maine (Second Congressional 
District) and New Hampshire (First Congressional District) switched from 
Democratic to Republican control in 2014. 




TABLE 6 - 2014 U.S. HOUSE RESULTS IN TWO-SEAT STATES 
 




HI  120,043  235,356  0  355,399  33.8  66.2  0  2  -33.8 
ID  275,072  160,078  7  435,157  63.2  36.8  2  0  36.8 
ME  228,071  305,242  59,058  592,371  38.5  51.5  1  1  11.5 
NH  232,379  247,469  0  479,848  48.4  51.6  1  1  1.6 
Total  855,565  948,145  59,065  1,862,775  45.9  50.9  4  4  4.1 
 
Combined, in one- and two-seat states, the margins largely canceled 
each other out in 2012, with Democrats and Republicans essentially tied 
at 48% of the total vote and with Democrats receiving about 25,000 more 
votes total; Democrats won eight seats as compared to Republicans’ seven, 
or 53% compared to 47%. In 2014, by contrast, the Republican small-state 
advantage was clearer, with Republicans winning a mere 49% of the vote 
in one- and two-seat states, but nine of 16 House seats, or 56%. 
When adding in three-seat states—Nebraska, New Mexico, and West 
Virginia—the margins more clearly favor Republicans. In 2012, 
Republicans won a combined 49% of the vote in one-, two-, and three-seat 
states, yet scored 13 of 24, or 54%, of the seats, as compared to Democrats’ 
48% of the combined vote and 46% of seats. In 2014, this advantage was 
much more pronounced, with Republicans defeating Democrats in the 
popular vote in one-, two-, and three-seat states by 51% to 46%, yet winning 
15 of 24, or 63%, of the seats. 
 
TABLE 7 - 2012 U.S. HOUSE RESULTS IN THREE-SEAT STATES 
 





R seat - vote 
margin 
NE 321,387 276,239 0 53.8 46.2 3 0 46.2 
NM 343,269 422,189 632 44.8 55.1 1 2 -11.5 
WV 384,253 257,101 0 59.9 40.1 2 1 26.6 
Total 1,048,909 955,529 632 52.3 47.7 6 3 14.3 
 
TABLE 8 - 2014 U.S. HOUSE RESULTS IN THREE-SEAT STATES 
 
State R vote D vote Other 
Total 
vote 








NE   340,816   185,234   9,021   535,071   63.7   34.6 2 1 3 
NM   271,222   240,663   0   511,885   53.0   47.0 1 2 -3 
WV   242,823   182,484   13,932   439,239   55.3   41.5 3 0 44.7 
Total   854,861   608,381   22,953  1,486,195   57.5   40.9 6 3 9.1 
 
Including four-seat states—Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, and 
Utah—makes the Republican advantage all the more evident. In 2012, in the 
19 states with one, two, three, or four seats, Republicans won 54% of the total 
vote compared to Democrats’ 42%. That translated into 29 of 44, or 66%, of 




seats, for a 12% margin. In 2014, this advantage was magnified. Republicans 
outpolled Democrats 54% to 42% in these 19 states, yet gained 33 of the 44 
seats, for a 75% seat share. Nationally, Republicans won 51% to 45% in votes 
for 247 of 435 seats, or 57%. The seats–vote margin nationally, therefore, was 
a mere 6% while in the smaller states, it was 21%. 
 
TABLE 9 - 2012 AND 2014 U.S. HOUSE RESULTS IN ONE-, TWO-, 
THREE-, AND FOUR-SEAT STATES COMBINED 
 












2012 6,813,046 5,295,896 551,066 12,660,008 53.8 41.8 29 15 12.1 
2014 4,918,034 3,775,678 351,893 9,045,605 54.4 41.7 33 11 20.6 
 
That Republicans benefit disproportionately from few-seat states would 
undoubtedly benefit from more rigorous empirical analysis. Nonetheless, its 
logic is intuitive. Requiring at least one seat per state, in combination with a 
prohibition on seats crossing state lines, prohibits coupling moderately pro-
Republican areas with highly Democratic urban areas in other states to form 
a more heterogeneous district. Thus, out-of-state areas cannot be sliced into 
districts that emanate from nearby major cities or their stateside densely 
populated ring suburbs that overwhelmingly lean Democratic. Examples 
include New Hampshire (Boston), Arkansas and Mississippi (Memphis), 
Kansas (Kansas City, Missouri), New Jersey (New York City), West 
Virginia (Washington, D.C.,159 Baltimore, and Pittsburgh), and 
Washington (Portland, Oregon.).160 
                                                                                                             
 159. Washington, D.C., of course, has no vote, which is part of the problem. 
See text accompanying note 88. 
 160. Splitting majority–minority urban districts might raise potential problems 
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973. See Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (applying § 2 of the VRA to a claim that redistricting 
diluted blacks’ chance of electing a representative of their choice). For instance, 
Tennessee’s Ninth Congressional District, centered in Memphis, has one of the 
highest percentages of African Americans in the country, although ironically it 
has had a white representative, Steve Cohen, since 2006. Kyle Veazey, Examining 
Another Challenge to Cohen, and Representation by Race in the 9th District, 
COMM. APPEAL (May 30, 2014), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/exam 
ining-another-challenge-to-cohen-and-representation-by-race-in-the-9th-ep-5101 
43392-328949521.html [https://perma.cc/S2TX-S7EE] (noting that Tennessee’s 
Ninth District “has the highest percent of blacks—65.3 percent—than [sic] any 
other Congressional district in the nation”); see also U.S. Census Bureau, 
Tennessee, Congressional District 9, MY CONG. DISTRICT, http://www 
.census.gov/mycd/application/index.html?st=47&cd=09&cngdst=426720 [https: 
//perma.cc/36U9-CB3P] (last visited Aug. 27, 2016) (noting that 464,002 of the 




For instance, Democrats utterly dominate Oregon’s Third 
Congressional District, centered on Portland, Oregon, with incumbent Earl 
Blumenauer winning 70% to 75% of the vote regularly. Meanwhile, just 
across the Columbia River in a district whose population base is in the 
Portland suburbs of Clark County, Washington, a Republican, Jaime 
Herrera Beutler, first won in 2010 in a close vote—53% to 47%—and, with 
the advantage of incumbency, has since won victories of approximately 
60% to 40%. Clearly, Democrats are “wasting” a significant number of 
votes on the south side of the Columbia River, unable to transfer them 
north. 
C. Voter Geographical Distribution, or “Unintentional 
Gerrymandering” 
In their pathbreaking work, political scientists Jowei Chen and Jonathan 
Rodden explain how even if House districts were drawn by neutral 
commissions not seeking to advantage either political party, Republicans 
would still enjoy an advantage in converting votes to seats because of the 
electorate’s residential patterns and the presumed requirements of compact 
and contiguous districts.161 Particularly in the Midwest, Northeast, and 
Florida, areas that were essential to President Barack Obama’s 2008 and 
2012 presidential wins, Democrats earn huge majorities in uncompetitive 
districts while Republicans generally win by smaller, even if still 
comfortable, majorities in suburban and rural districts. Democrats thus 
                                                                                                             
Tennessee’s Ninth District’s 711,664 residents, or 65.2%, are African American) 
(based on 2013 estimates). Kansas City, Mo., has a black representative, Emanuel 
Cleaver, although his district, Missouri’s Fifth, is only about one-fifth black. U.S. 
Census Bureau, Missouri, Congressional District 5, MY CONG. DISTRICT 
http://www.census.gov/mycd/application/index.html?st=29&cd=05&cngdst=42
6720 [https://perma.cc/H9FJ-N7FL] (last visited Aug. 27, 2016) (163,411 of 
758,911, or 21.5%, is African American) (based on 2013 estimates). In 2014, 
Cleaver defeated his Republican opponent by the relatively small margin of 52% 
to 45%. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that VRA § 2 claims can only be brought 
when redistricting dilutes a minority group’s population that was previously 
greater than 50%. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 19–20 (2009) (“[A] party 
asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.”). 
Under Bartlett, therefore, unpacking a district like Missouri’s Fifth would not 
raise VRA problems. 
 161. Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political 
Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 239 (2013). 




“waste” many more votes than Republicans due to the urban concentration 
of their base.162 
At least theoretically, in a square-shaped state with a concentration of 
Democratic votes in the center of the state, pie-slice-shaped districts 
radiating out from the central city to rural areas could distribute partisan 
preferences evenly, or perhaps even in Democrats’ favor.163 Colorado, 
with Denver somewhere near the middle, is perhaps the most realistic 
approximation of this hypothetical state. In most states, however, 
Democratic-leaning, densely populated urban areas are located in random 
spots around the state and they cannot easily be combined with more rural 
areas while preserving contiguity and compactness.164 Moreover, given the 
state-line barrier, pie-shaped districts cannot penetrate into another state in 
an effort to create more competitive districts, and the Voting Rights Act 
might prevent intentional dilution of urban or Democratic majorities when 
they are majority African-American or Hispanic.165 
The phenomenon of unintentional gerrymandering is dependent on 
demographic patterns that are prevalent in many or most, but not all, states. 
In a handful of very urbanized states, such as Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, Democratic voters are spread sufficiently throughout the state so 
that unintentional gerrymandering is less likely.166 Moreover, in some 
southern and western states, the presence of rural voters who frequently 
vote for Democratic candidates—Hispanics in southern Colorado; African 
Americans in some Deep South states—also reduces unintentional 
gerrymandering.167  
Chen and Rodden recognize that voter preferences might not be 
completely exogenous of districting. The concentration of liberal voters in 
urban districts might lead to a more liberal Democratic platform than 
                                                                                                             
 162. Id. at 256. 
 163. Id. (“In theory, it seems that a clever Democratic cartographer might 
generate radial districts emanating from the city centers so as to break up the major 
agglomerations and create snake-like districts to connect some of the smaller 
cities.”). 
 164. Id. at 257 (“[H]uman geography makes the task of a Democratic 
cartographer far more difficult than that facing a Republican-favoring 
cartographer.”); cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164, 173 n.12 (1986) 
(Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (disfavoring “grotesque” districting). 
 165. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012) (prohibiting state action that results in 
“less opportunity [for citizens of a particular racial group] than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice”). 
 166. Chen & Rodden, supra note 161, at 264 (discussing New Jersey). 
 167. Id. at 242, 262; Morrill et al., supra note 27, at 527 (discussing rural 
counties that favor Democrats). 




would occur if Democratic voters were spread out, which then makes it 
harder for the party to compete in crucial moderate districts.168 If urban 
liberals were mixed with more moderate and conservative suburban 
voters, Democrats might present different views to win in such a system. 
In a similar vein, commentators have argued that the Democrats’ strategy 
of relying, successfully, on urban voters to win presidential elections 
backfires in House elections by linking House candidates to urban-
friendly, liberal policies unpopular in their districts.169 This may be true, 
but it is only normatively defensible if there is something sacred about a 
legislature composed of contiguous districts. The cost is not defensible if 
one proceeds from the premise that the government, as a whole, ought to 
be majoritarian, and that votes should count equally regardless of where 
they are cast. The very majority that elects a president ought to be able to 
elect its preferred representatives in the national legislature.  
Unlike the Senate, the House’s bias in favor of rural and exurban 
Republican-leaning voters is more lightly etched in constitutional stone. 
Ending the prohibition on districts crossing state lines would presumably 
require a federal constitutional amendment. Other changes, however, 
would require only statutory or state constitutional change. One possibility 
is returning to at-large elections in states with multiple representatives. 
Several states elected at least some of their representatives at-large 50 
years ago.170 Fearing that the South might use at-large elections to prevent 
the election of African-American representatives, Congress in 1967 
required that states with more than one seat elect all representatives by 
district.171 Although this provision, in conjunction with the Voting Rights 
Act, has helped enlarge the number of African Americans in the House, it 
may now substantially contribute to the weakening of urban—and, to a 
large extent, African-American—political power.172 An alternative change 
                                                                                                             
 168. Chen & Rodden, supra note 161, at 266 (citing Stephen Ansolabehere et 
al., When Parties Are Not Teams: Party Positions in Single Member District and 
Proportional Representation Systems, 49 ECON. THEORY 521 (2012)). 
 169. Cohn, supra note 152 (noting that a strategy that works for national 
presidential elections can backfire in House). 
 170. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 n.1 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(noting that in 1962, all representatives were elected at large in Alabama (eight), 
Hawaii (two), and New Mexico (two), while five other states each elected one of 
their multiple representatives at large). 
 171. Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581.  
 172. See supra note 160. With respect to majority–minority districts, the 
“general consensus” in the scholarly literature is that they have helped minority 
voters, but hurt the Democratic party, which is the party overwhelmingly 
supported by both African Americans and urban dwellers. Adam B. Cox & Richard 




would be to abandon contiguous and compact districts as the goal for 
district drawing.173 Because the current representatives of large cities 
might lose their “safe seats” under such a scheme, they might be loath to 
support it.174 
D. Note on the President and the Electoral College 
Although this Article focuses primarily on the lawmaking process and 
thus looks most intently at Congress, it is worth examining the presidential 
selection process briefly given the president’s crucial role in the lawmaking 
process. The Electoral College allocates electoral votes on the basis of a 
state’s total Congressional representation—Senate plus House.175 The 
Electoral College thus skews somewhat away from one-person, one-vote, 
and in favor of smaller states because of the extra two votes attributable to 
Senate seats. Thus, although California—the nation’s largest state—has 
12.1% of the nation’s population, it cast only 55 of 538, or 10.2%, of 
electoral votes in the 2012 presidential election.176 By contrast, Wyoming—
the nation’s least populous state with less than 0.2% of the population—
casts 3 of 538 electoral votes, or almost 0.6%. The Electoral College is far 
more adherent to one-person, one-vote than the grossly malapportioned 
                                                                                                             
T. Holden, Reconsidering Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
553, 559 & n.21 (2011) (citing numerous works on the subject); see also Charles 
Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black 
Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 809–10 (1996) 
(concluding that “[o]utside the South, substantive minority representation is best 
served by distributing black voters equally among all districts,” and a “trade-off 
does exist between substantive and descriptive representation”); David Epstein et 
al., Estimating the Effect of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation, 
23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 499, 517 (2007) (concluding that “fewer minority 
representatives” in certain states might correspond with “greater overall influence 
on policy”). Cox and Holden question this consensus in recent work. See Cox & 
Holden, supra at 603–04.  
 173. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(2)–(4) (West 2016) (requiring that 
Congressional districts coincide with boundaries of political subdivisions; that 
they be of “convenient contiguous territory”; and that they be “reasonably 
compact in form . . . and not irregularly shaped”). 
 174. Cf. Rodden, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that many leftist leaders opposed 
moving from district-based representational systems to proportional 
representation because they would lose the power that came with safe seats). 
 175. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 176. Because Washington, D.C. is part of the Electoral College, see U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXIII, the author includes its population in the nation’s 
population for these purposes. 




Senate, but less so than the House. The addition of the District of Columbia 
to the Electoral College by the Twenty-third Amendment in 1961, 
however, has slightly mitigated the college’s amplification of rural states 
given that the highly urban District receives the same two “extra” votes as 
small states.177 
With respect to partisan bias, the Electoral College is likely to function 
better than the House of Representatives because all but two small states, 
Maine and Nebraska, allocate their electoral votes on a statewide basis.178 
Thus, the countermajoritarian statewide results that occurred with respect 
to U.S. House elections in 2012 will not occur in 48 states.179 On the other 
hand, severe imbalance in performance among the several states could lead 
to some partisan bias in the college. Imagine a candidate winning the bare 
majority of states to amass an electoral majority by a combined vote of 
51% to 49%, while her opponent wins the other states by a much greater 
margin. Obviously, from the standpoint of one-person, one-vote and 
partisan fairness, the Electoral College falls short of the ideal of a national 
popular vote. As in 2000 and before, a candidate might win the popular 
vote and lose the college.180 Moreover, the state-by-state allocation of 
electoral votes leads to candidates spending far more money and attention 
on a handful of “swing states,” and the traditional role of certain early 
states like Iowa and New Hampshire in the party nominating process leads 
to excess attention to issues of particular concern to these states. 
Nonetheless, the presidential selection process has the potential to 
disadvantage urban voters less than the Senate and the U.S. House as 
currently districted. 
                                                                                                             
 177. Id. 
 178. See Mitch Smith, Nebraska Legislature Rejects Winner-Take-All 
Electoral Vote System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/20 
16/04/13/us/nebraska-legislature-rejects-winner-take-all-electoral-vote-system 
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UR4K-CKS9] (noting that Maine and Nebraska are 
the only states that do not allocate their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis). 
 179. Others, focusing only on one-person, one-vote, have declared the House to 
be more democratic than the presidency. See Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative 
Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free 
Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government 
Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1641–42 n.230 (2012).  
 180. See 2000 Official Presidential Election Results, FED. ELEC. COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm [https://perma.cc/59S5-242G] 
(showing that Al Gore won 544,000 more votes than George W. Bush nationwide 
yet lost the Electoral College vote) (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 




V. THE URBAN DISADVANTAGE IN THE STATES 
As compared to the federal government, states are a beacon of 
democracy. Reynolds’s strict mandate ensures that all state legislative 
houses conform to one-person, one-vote.181 Moreover, governors are 
elected on a simple, statewide one-person, one-vote basis in almost every 
state,182 and to the extent that many states rely on direct democracy to enact 
laws, these too are voted for on the basis of one-person, one-vote. 
A. Partisan Bias in State Legislatures is Similar to the U.S. House 
Although states comply with one-person, one-vote, many suffer from 
partisan biases similar to those that plague the U.S. House. The same 
overlap of residential demography and political preference that skews the 
U.S. House in favor of Republicans operates, perforce, at the state level 
because a vast majority use contiguous, single-member, winner-take-all 
districts to elect legislators.183 Florida, for instance, is relatively evenly 
                                                                                                             
 181. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Despite applying one-person, 
one-vote to state legislative districts just as to U.S. House districts within states, 
the Supreme Court has allowed somewhat greater variation in the former than in 
the latter. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1983) (citing Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321–23 (1973)) (requiring nearly absolute equality for 
House districts, but permitting more variation for state legislative districts to 
accommodate “local interests”).  
 182. Vermont and Mississippi are the most notable deviants from one-person, 
one-vote in gubernatorial elections. Mississippi uses an “electoral” system similar 
to the presidential election. In Mississippi, state house districts serve as the 
constituent units of which a gubernatorial candidate must win a majority. MISS. 
CONST. art. V, § 140. When no candidate receives both an electoral and popular 
majority, the house of representatives picks the governor by viva voce vote. Id. § 
141. In Vermont, members of the legislature from both houses, voting jointly, 
select the governor by secret ballot when no candidate receives an outright 
majority. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 47; see also D. Gregory Sanford & Paul Gillies, 
And If There Be No Choice Made: A Meditation on Section 47 of the Vermont 
Constitution, 27 VT. L. REV. 783 (2003).  
 183. Only ten states still use any form of multi-member district (“MMD”) to 
elect state legislators, and all but two of those, Vermont and West Virginia, use 
them only for their lower house. See Karl Kurtz, Changes in Legislatures Using 
Multimember Districts after Redistricting, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG.: THE THICKET 
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/09/a-slight-decline-in-
legislatures-using-multimember-districts-after-redistricting.html [https://perma.cc 
/Y3BP-CJBH]. Among the ten states that use MMDs, only four—Arizona, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, and South Dakota—are “pure” MMD states that elect all 
members of their lower house from MMDs, and all four of these states elect only 




divided between Democratic and Republican voters statewide. President 
Obama won the state narrowly in both 2008 and 2012 on the strength of a 
strong urban performance.184 The recent governor’s races have been 
extraordinarily close.185  
Divide the Florida electorate into reasonably compact, contiguous 
districts for the purpose of electing state legislators, however, and Democratic 
strength rapidly dissipates. Democrats simply waste too many votes in 
densely packed urban enclaves. Indeed, as Chen and Rodden show, the more 
contiguous districts that a state like Florida is divided into, the more 
pronounced the partisan bias.186 Hence, according to Chen and Rodden, the 
partisan bias should be more pronounced in the state house than in the state 
senate because the former has more seats. Beyond a certain number of districts, 
around 75 in Florida, it becomes impossible to correct the pro-Republican bias 
even with blatant, intentional pro-Democratic gerrymandering.187 Bearing out 
                                                                                                             
two members from a district. See Jeffrey Alan Taylor, Electoral Systems and 
Representation: The Effects of District Magnitude 7–9 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with author). Because a two-member 
district in these states remains small geographically—usually, the size of a state 
senate district—the use of MMDs would not substantially cut into any unintentional 
gerrymandering. Moreover, among the states that use pure MMDs, only Arizona, 
perhaps, might be expected to experience significant anti-urban unintentional 
gerrymandering. 
 184. In 2008, Obama defeated McCain 51% to 48.2% in Florida; in 2012, 
Obama defeated Romney 50% to 49.1% in Florida. See United States Presidential 
Election Results, DAVID LIEP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://us 
electionatlas.org/RESULTS/ [https://perma.cc/9E6K-HBBQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 
2016) (select from dropdown menu General by Year: 2012; then select the state of 
Florida); id. (select from dropdown menu General by Year: 2008; then select the 
state of Florida). The results demonstrate that President Obama won populous 
Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Orange (Orlando) counties by comfortable 
margins, and Pinellas and Hillsborough counties (Tampa Bay area) by smaller 
margins.  
 185. Republican Rick Scott won both races in 2010 and 2014 by small margins 
over his Democratic opponents: 48.1% to 47.1% and 48.9% to 47.7%, respectively.  
 186. Chen & Rodden, supra note 161, at 252 fig.4. 
 187. Id. at 252, 256 (discussing the impossibility of producing any simulation 
whereby Congressional, state senate, or state house districts are either neutral or 
pro-Democratic in distribution of seats). It should be noted that the hypothetical 
districts drawn by Chen and Rodden in their simulations were not districts that 
complied with state districting law or the Voting Rights Act. See Legislative 
Parties’ Answer Brief and Initial Brief on Cross Appeal at 46–48, League of 
Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (2015) (No. SC14-1905), 2015 
WL 7340037 (criticizing expert report submitted by Chen and Rodden as part of 
political gerrymandering litigation in Florida).  




Chen and Rodden’s thesis, in recent years, Republicans have utterly dominated 
control of Florida’s state legislature, now enjoying a two-to-one majority in 
the state house and a solid majority in the state senate188—a dominance that 
would persist even with neutrally drawn districts. The end result is a state 
legislature that veers away from the median statewide voter’s view in the 
direction of the ideology of rural and exurban voters. The Florida legislature, 
for instance, has steadfastly refused to expand Medicaid under the Affordable 
Care Act, which is the signature domestic accomplishment of President 
Obama, for whom the state voted twice.189 
The same partisan bias exhibited by the Florida legislature can be 
expected in other states with significant urban–rural divides in the electorate. 
Just as Florida’s U.S. House partisan bias is magnified by the many legislative 
districts in its statehouse, it is likely that the same dynamic occurs in Indiana, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
These are all states that have voted for a Democratic president in one or both 
of the last two national elections. Yet, the chart below shows their state house 
composition after the 2008 and 2012 elections, respectively. 
 
                                                                                                             
 188. As of 2016, Republicans control the Florida senate by 26 to 14 and the 
house of representatives by 81 to 39. 2016 Governors and Legislatures, 
MULTISTATE ASSOC. INC., https://www.multistate.com/state-resources/governors-
legislatures [https://perma.cc/XA3D-N2SU] (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). Even in 
Democratic “wave” years like 2008 and 2012, Republicans maintained their iron 
grip on the statehouse, with majorities of 76 to 44 and 26 to 14 after 2008 and 
majorities of 74 to 46 and 26 to 14, respectively after 2012. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 261 tbl.419, 
http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/2012-
statab.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VJE-E2WH]; Florida House of Representatives 
Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_House_of_Repre 
sentatives_elections,_2012 [https://perma.cc/645Y-BU28 ] (last visited Sept. 9, 
2016); Florida State Senate Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballo 
tpedia.org/Florida_State_Senate_elections,_2012 [https://perma.cc/ZB6G-VSQT] 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 189. See Nick Madigan, Health Care Expansion Is Rejected in Florida, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/us/health-care-
expansion-is-rejected-in-florida.html [https://perma.cc/DH69-DQC2] (reporting 
that the Florida House of Representatives rejected an expansion of Medicaid that 
would have covered as many as 650,000 residents by 72 to 41, with all 37 
Democrats and four Republicans voting for the measure). 




TABLE 10 - RECENT PARTISAN COMPOSITION 
OF LEGISLATURES IN KEY STATES190 
 
 After 2008 election After 2012 election 
State Senate (R-D) House (R-D-I)191 Senate (R-D) House (R-D) 
IN 33-17 48-52 37-13 69-31 
MI 21-17 43-67 26-12 59-50 
NC 20-30 52-68 33-17 77-43 
OH 21-12 46-53 23-10 60-39 
PA 30-20 99-104 27-23 110-93 
VA 19-21 52-44-2 20-20 67-33 
WI 15-18 46-52 18-15 60-39 
 
As the numbers indicate, after the 2008 presidential election, Democrats 
controlled 9 of the 14 houses in these states. To some extent, this control was 
attributable to gains made during the Democratic “wave” of the 2006 
midterms, some of which were further cemented in 2008.192 After the pro-
Republican tidal wave of the 2010 midterms, however, followed by pro-
Republican gerrymandering in many of these states, Democrats controlled 
none of these houses by 2013, despite President Obama carrying five—
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin—of the seven states 
in 2012 and finishing close behind in a sixth (North Carolina). It is likely that 
the pro-Republican wave of 2010, followed by political gerrymandering, 
helped restore Republicans’ natural advantage in these states.193 The 2014 
pro-Republican midterm wave only further cemented this advantage insofar 
as it was compounded by incumbency. Thus, it will require another huge pro-
                                                                                                             
 190. Virginia holds its state office elections in odd years, so they are not 
simultaneous with presidential elections. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-214 (West 2016) 
(timing of Virginia senate elections); id. § 24.2-215 (timing of its house of delegates 
elections). Michigan elects its entire state senate in Congressional “midterm” or non-
presidential election years. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.170 (West 2016) 
(establishing state senate elections in 1966 and then every four years after). 
 191. Wisconsin’s lower house is known as the Assembly. WIS. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 1. Virginia’s lower house is known as the House of Delegates. VA. CONST. art. 
IV, § 1. 
 192. See James E. Campbell, The Midterm Landslide of 2010: A Triple Wave 
Election, FORUM, Jan. 2010, at 4–7, DE GRUYTER, File No. 10.2202/1540-
8884.1405 (discussing the pro-Democratic waves of the 2006 and 2008 elections).  
 193. See id. (discussing 2010 pro-Republican wave); see also McDonald, 
supra note 144, at 76–77 (discussing “wave” elections and their disparate partisan 
effect); see also DALEY, supra note 156, at 82 (noting that Democrats in Michigan 
won the aggregate vote for the state house by 54.7% to 45.3% in 2012 yet 
Republicans maintained a 59 to 51 lock on the state legislature due to post-2010 
gerrymandering). 




Democratic national wave for Democrats to even have a chance at parity in 
many of these states’ legislatures in the future.194  
As noted earlier, Chen and Rodden demonstrate that the greater the 
number of districts, the more difficult it is to correct Republicans’ seats-to-
votes advantage in states with a political demography like Florida’s. At the 
same time, increasing the number of seats does reduce and narrow the range 
of the potential pro-Republican advantage.195 Interestingly, the evidence in 
Table 10, albeit from a limited time frame, shows that most state houses with 
more seats are less Republican-leaning as compared to state senates. Only in 
Virginia is the percentage of Republicans in the state house after 2012—
67%—notably greater than the percentage in the state senate—50%.196 This 
evidence confirms that many of these state legislatures engaged in intentional, 
pro-Republican gerrymandering in 2010; as predicted by Chen and Rodden, 
the effect of such intentional gerrymandering is greater in the legislative house 
with fewer seats.  
Three caveats must be offered to the conclusion that states suffer from 
partisan bias in a manner similar to that of the U.S. House. First, as noted 
above, the phenomenon of unintentional gerrymandering depends upon 
residential political patterns that exist in many, but not all, states.197 Second, 
just as partisan affiliation serves as a stand-in for ideology in the House, state 
political parties might have ideologies that vary even more greatly from the 
national party’s than individual House candidates.198 This variation might 
cause more or less polarization. If Republican legislators are nearly as liberal 
as Democrats in a particular state, the partisan divide might not matter 
much.199 By contrast, in some states, Democrats in the state legislature may 
be more liberal than their national counterparts and Republicans may be more 
                                                                                                             
 194. Id. at 215 (noting that Democrats would need a “historic record” in 2018 
state legislative elections and “another big one” in 2020 to neutralize the 
Republican advantage in districting). 
 195. Chen & Rodden, supra note 161, at 252–53 & fig.4 (“As the size of the 
legislature increases further, some of the medium-density Democratic clusters in 
suburbs and small towns that had previously been subsumed . . . begin to win their 
own seats, and thus the Republican seat share slowly declines.”). 
 196. In Wisconsin, it is 60% to 54.5%, while in Pennsylvania it is an 
infinitesimal 54.2% to 54%.  
 197. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American 
Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530, 549 (2011) (“[D]espite strong 
nationalizing trends in American politics, political parties below the national level 
are quite heterogeneous.”).  
 199. See id. at 546 (noting that Rhode Island and Louisiana have two of the 
least polarized state legislatures because Democrats and Republicans are more 
liberal in the former, while they are more conservative in the latter). 




conservative, thus causing more polarization at the state level than exists at 
the national.200  
The third caveat is that Democratic state legislative candidates are 
particularly likely to suffer from reduced turnout. State legislative elections 
often occur in non-presidential election years, when Democratic voters are 
often especially unlikely to turn out, thus leading to “dropoff” for Democratic 
candidates.201 In New Jersey and Virginia, all state legislative elections are in 
uneven years,202 and in Michigan, the entire state senate is elected in midterm 
even years.203 Regardless of when their elections are held, state legislative 
candidates also suffer from higher “roll-off”—that is, voters failing to 
complete their ballots “down” to lower-profile races like state legislature.204 
In the vast majority of states that lack straight-ticket voting, down-ballot roll-
off reduces votes by core Democratic constituencies like African 
Americans.205 Low turnout thus at least partly explains why President Obama 
                                                                                                             
 200. See id. (concluding that 15 state legislatures are more polarized than 
Congress for the previous 15 years). 
 201. See Thomas F. Schaller, Democrats Dread 2014 Drop-Off, SABATO’S 
CRYSTAL BALL (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles 
/democrats-dread-2014-drop-off/ [https://perma.cc/K2QR-FMLY] (noting “[l]ower 
midterm turnouts tend to skew the electorate” toward Republican-leaning voters).  
 202. General Info, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/legislativepub/our.asp [https://perma.cc/A3ZZ-4EU3] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016); 
see also supra note 190 (citing Virginia election code).  
 203. See supra note 190 (citing Michigan election code). 
 204. See Chris W. Bonneau & Eric Loepp, Getting Things Straight: The 
Effects of Ballot Design and Electoral Structure on Voter Participation, 34 
ELECTORAL STUD. 119, 121 (2014) (defining “roll-off”); Matthew Davis & 
Priscilla Southwell, Closing the Gap in State Legislative Races: The Effect of 
Campaign Spending on Ballot Drop-Off, 8 J. POL. & L. 118, 118 (2015) (“State 
legislative races . . . usually account for relatively lower turnout compared to the 
races at the top of the ticket.”). Some scholars use the terms “roll-off” and “drop-
off” interchangeably, or use “roll-off” to signify a specific form of “drop-off.” 
E.g., id. at 120. 
 205. Douglas G. Feig, Race, Roll-Off, and the Straight-Ticket Option, 35 POL. 
& POL’Y 548, 559 (2007) (concluding that black roll-off exceeds white roll-off 
for election to lower-level offices except where straight-ticket voting is an option); 
see also Mich. St. A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 2016 WL 3922355, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. July 22, 2016) (enjoining under the Voting Rights Act a Michigan 
law abolishing straight-ticket voting because plaintiffs’ expert had shown “that 
African-American voters were much more likely to use straight-party voting than 
white voters, and that [the law in question] would have a larger impact on African-
American populations than white ones”). Only ten states now offer straight-ticket 
voting, down from 14 since just 2010. Straight Ticket Voting States, NAT’L CONF. 
OF STATE LEGS. (Jan. 8, 2016) http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-




might win a state like Florida twice while at the same time, Republicans 
overwhelmingly retain control of the state legislature.206 
B. Governors, Other Officials Elected Statewide, and Direct Democracy 
States’ elections for governor fully comply with the mandate of one-
person, one-vote. Moreover, because governors are elected statewide, and not 
by a composite of intrastate district votes, there is no partisan bias in their 
election.207 Governors, therefore, are the most democratically legitimate 
branch of any government that has been discussed thus far, at least when 
elected by a majority or significant plurality. As such, majoritarian governors 
have the potential to serve as a moderating force on their legislatures in states 
that suffer from pro-Republican partisan bias, whether they are Republican, 
Democrat, or independent.208 Almost every state also elects other executive 
officials with some policymaking authority, such as an attorney general, a 
secretary of state, and a treasurer.209 Although these officials usually play only 
minor roles in the legislative process, they may promulgate regulations and 
                                                                                                             
campaigns/straight-ticket-voting.aspx#2 [https://perma.cc/7ERM-M2DL] (noting 
the abolition of straight-ticket voting in West Virginia in 2015, in Rhode Island in 
2014, in North Carolina in 2013, and in Wisconsin in 2011, as well as the Michigan 
legislature’s now-enjoined attempt to eliminate it in 2016). 
 206. Florida does not have straight-ticket voting. Id. 
 207. The lone exceptions are Mississippi and, to a lesser extent, Vermont. See 
discussion supra note 182. 
 208. Cf. Nate Silver, In State Governments, Signs of a Healthier G.O.P., N.Y. 
TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 16, 2013, 8:35 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.ny 
times.com/2013/04/16/in-state-governments-signs-of-a-healthier-g-o-p/ [https://per 
ma.cc/W9JS-AZM8] (demonstrating that the more moderate Republican governors 
enjoy higher popularity ratings). Recent examples of Republican governors with a 
“moderate” reputation in states with Republican legislatures include John Kasich of 
Ohio and Rick Snyder of Michigan. See Nate Silver, Kasich Could Be the GOP’s 
Moderate Backstop, N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 14, 2015, 1:07 PM), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/kasich-could-be-the-gops-moderate-backstop/ 
[https://perma.cc/UH3G-VERZ]; see also Harry Enten, Rick Snyder Has a Chris 
Christie Problem, N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 29, 2015, 12:08 PM), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/rick-snyder-has-a-chris-christie-problem/ [https: 
//perma.cc/7TC8-PEHM] (rating Snyder as a moderate Republican). Other recent 
Republican governors in states won by President Obama, by contrast, have not served 
as a moderating force on their legislatures, such as Scott Walker of Wisconsin. Id. 
(rating Walker as more conservative than Kasich and Snyder).  
 209. John Dinan, United States of America, in 3 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON 
FEDERALISM 316, 328–29 (Katy Le Roy et al. eds., 2006). 




set enforcement priorities that bring the state’s governmental output, as a 
whole, more toward the views of the mean statewide voter. 
In addition to executive officials, a strong majority of states elect the 
members of the highest state court. Many states also elect members of their 
intermediate appellate courts. In almost all of these states, such elections are 
conducted statewide.210 In many states, therefore, elected judges might also 
serve as a moderating influence on legislatures suffering from partisan bias. 
Although state judges enjoy broad authority to interpret the common law, the 
possibility of an override by the legislature might constrain judges’ ability to 
interpret the common law more in line with the median voter’s views. 
Obviously, with respect to positive legislation, or statutes, judges play only a 
reactive role, and any such decisions in this context also remain vulnerable to 
legislative override. More broadly, judicial elections are notoriously low-
information affairs with relatively weak voter participation.211 Codes of 
conduct and professional norms prohibit judges from sharing their views 
openly with the electorate.212 Prevailing mythology, popular among many 
judges, lawyers, and voters, holds that despite being elected officials, judges 
interpret the law “neutrally” rather than represent the views of their 
constituents.213 For all these reasons, a state judiciary might serve as a modest 
corrective, at most, to a state legislature suffering from partisan bias. 
The final way in which statewide elections might temper a legislature 
suffering from anti-urban partisan bias is through direct democracy, whether 
initiative or referendum. All such statewide votes are conducted on a strict 
                                                                                                             
 210. In 42 states, the top courts’ judges are either elected statewide or appointed 
by the governor who is elected statewide. See Diller, supra note 6, at 1162. 
 211. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 43, 53–54 (2003) (noting low turnout in judicial elections and voters’ lack 
of familiarity with candidates). 
 212. See id. at 60–61 (discussing the canons of judicial conduct that help make 
it “impossible for voters to gather the information they need to make intelligent 
decisions”). 
 213. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) 
(distinguishing judges from politicians); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 
U.S. 765, 803–04 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Whether state or federal, 
elected or appointed, judges perform a function fundamentally different from that 
of the people's elected representatives.”); id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he elected judge . . . does not serve a constituency . . . . He may make 
common law, but judged on the merits of individual cases, not as a mandate from 
the voters.”); see also John M. Scheb II. & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality 
and Public Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 929 (2000) 
(asserting that the American people believe the “myth of legality”—“that cases 
are decided by the application of legal rules formulated and applied through a 
politically and philosophically neutral process of legal reasoning”). 




one-person, one-vote basis statewide, thereby suffering from no district-
induced partisan bias. In states with robust systems of direct voter 
participation, therefore, voters might police the legislature by repealing or 
merely threatening to repeal legislation that strays too far from the statewide 
median view.214 Moreover, voters could affirmatively enact legislation that is 
in keeping with their views if the legislature fails to do so. 
Direct democracy, however, is far from a substitute for a legislature that 
represents the median voter. As an initial matter, about half the states either 
do not have direct democracy or have only a very limited variety.215 
Moreover, direct democracy suffers from a number of pathologies like the up-
or-down nature of ballot measures and the lack of any deliberative process 
preceding their adoption.216 The particularly potent influence of interest-group 
money in the direct democracy context is also a concern.217 Nonetheless, in 
the states that have it, direct democracy might serve as a modest corrective to 
the legislature with respect to issues where district-based representatives do 
not adequately reflect the views of the voters, especially to the disadvantage 
of urban voters.218 
                                                                                                             
 214. See Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 
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 216. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 293, 299 (2007).  
 217. See Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 
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 218. See Kevin Arceneaux, Direct Democracy and the Link between Public 
Opinion and State Abortion Policy, 2 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 372, 383 (2002) 
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Raise Passes in Four GOP States, HUFFINGTON POST: POLITICS (Nov. 4, 2014, 
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passes_n_6095458.html [https://perma.cc/D4XR-GVLL] (noting that voters in 
states voted for minimum wage as a way of “bypass[ing] reluctant state 
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Jr. et al., Gun Behind the Door? Ballot Initiatives, State Policies and Public 
Opinion, 58 J. POL. 760, 769 (1996) (finding no evidence that the initiative 
process is associated with more responsive legislative politics). 




VI. OTHER STRUCTURAL URBAN DISADVANTAGES 
Densely populated urban areas suffer from other harms in the state and 
federal systems not directly attributable to representational dilution. 
Metropolitan areas lack a strong, institutional mechanism for collective 
action. States, of course, can join together through interstate compacts, subject 
to approval by Congress,219 but cities and metros have no such mechanism. 
Moreover, the action of the federal government is, to some extent, the action 
of the states, as famously theorized by Herbert Wechsler. Wechsler asserted 
that the Constitution’s institutional safeguards protect states from overreach 
by the federal government, so much so that it may not be necessary for the 
judiciary to enforce independently asserted constitutional constraints on 
federal power.220 One may disagree with Wechsler’s conclusion and still 
recognize the vast institutional advantages that states enjoy, such as the 
composition of the Senate and the Electoral College. 
The Constitution, by contrast, completely ignores cities and counties. 
States are largely free under the federal Constitution to draw Congressional 
districts in a manner that disrespects local jurisdictional lines.221 House district 
lines slicing through cities and counties presumably weaken any affinity 
between a House member and the interests of the particular municipal 
communities that he represents. With respect to multistate metropolitan areas, 
the Constitution actively disfavors any institutional representation thereof. 
The confinement of Senate and House seats to single states ensures that such 
metro areas are divided among numerous representatives. There is no senator 
for the 18-million-person New York City metropolitan area—only senators 
who represent one of the three states it comprises. One might argue that this 
means that there are six senators who care about the region—two each from 
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. That is to some degree true, but 
each pair of senators will be concerned with only their slice of the metro area 
and must also focus on the far-flung regions of the rest of the state. 
Ironically, cities’ and counties’ lack of institutional representation at the 
state level is to some degree the result of one-person, one-vote. Before 
Reynolds and Wesberry, many states used local jurisdictional boundaries—
usually counties—as the means for allocating state legislative and U.S. House 
                                                                                                             
 219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (allowing states to enter into “Agreement[s] 
or Compact[s]” with “the Consent of Congress”). 
 220. Wechsler, supra note 10. 
 221. But see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 758–59 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stressing the importance of respect for political subdivision 
boundaries when analyzing whether de minimis variations from equal population 
violate the Equal Protection clause). 




seats.222 This rigid reliance on local boundaries—for example, giving each 
county at least one state senator regardless of population—caused the massive 
disparities that the Supreme Court corrected in 1964. From the standpoint of 
urban political influence, the tradeoff was obviously worth it, as the localities 
most advantaged by the prior system were low in population and rural.223 
Even after Reynolds, many states have sought to ensure that their legislative 
districts respect local boundaries while complying with one-person, one-vote, 
usually by directing that cities and counties not be sliced up unless necessary.224 
A handful of states use multi-member districts to accommodate the deviations 
in population among building-block units of towns or counties.225 Some of the 
recent efforts to cut down on political gerrymandering by delegating districting 
to neutral commissions have included in their mandates that local boundaries 
be respected “to the extent practicable.”226 In these states, cities and counties 
enjoy more institutional protection than the federal Constitution alone provides. 
                                                                                                             
 222. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 539 (1964) (discussing Alabama 
constitutional provisions requiring state senate and house seats for each county 
regardless of population); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and 
the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1405–09 (2012) (tracing the 
history of legislative representation based on political subdivision units from 
England to pre-1964 United States) (“In 1955, on the eve of the reapportionment 
revolution, nine states still elected at least one chamber purely by town or by 
county.”). 
 223. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. II, § 13 (1964) (providing each town with one 
representative in the General Assembly); see also Buckley v. Hoff, 234 F. Supp. 
191, 197 (D. Vt. 1964) (noting that “gross[] malapportion[ment]” of the Vermont 
House of Representatives resulted in one representative for the town of Stratton’s 
38 people and one representative for Burlington’s 35,531 people), modifying sub 
nom. Parsons v. Buckley, 379 U.S. 359 (1965) (per curiam). 
 224. See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Parity: 
Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 896 & n.45 (2006) (“Twenty state constitutions . . . contain 
some kind of restriction on the division of local government units or the crossing 
of local government boundaries in the creation of election districts.”); see also, 
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.010 (West 2016) (imploring mapmakers to 
“consider . . . political boundaries” when redrawing legislative districts). 
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The value of any such institutional safeguards for localities is limited, 
however, for a number of reasons. First, as they are not established by the 
federal Constitution, these safeguards may be eliminated through state 
legislation or constitutional amendment. Second, by their very nature, 
these safeguards cannot apply to interstate metropolitan areas. Third, they 
are subject to override by both one-person, one-vote, even if there is more 
flexibility for state legislatures than for U.S. House districts,227 and the 
Voting Rights Act. Finally, unlike states, cities’ territorial integrity enjoys 
no federal constitutional protection, and in most states, no state 
constitutional protection.228 Hence, even if state law requires that city or 
county boundaries be respected when districting, state legislatures remain 
relatively free to redraw those boundaries.229 The net result is that cities, 
counties, and metropolitan areas lack anything near the institutional 
safeguards that the states enjoy.  
This institutional disadvantage compounds the numeric, representational 
disadvantage from which cities suffer at the national level. The compounded 
disadvantage means that federal policy is likely to tilt away from urban 
preferences even more than it would if the disadvantage were merely a result 
of malapportionment and partisan bias. To be sure, the policies of some 
states—compact, urbanized states like Maryland, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey, and even California, Illinois, and New York230—likely mirror in large 
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part the preferences of urban areas. Hence, insofar as the institutional 
safeguards of federalism reflect the preferences of these states, urban voters 
would not be disadvantaged. However, the Senate’s malapportionment 
ensures that, on the whole, any benefits from institutional safeguards will 
accrue to the more sparsely populated states. This will be particularly evident 
with respect to blocking legislation; the representatives from a large number 
of relatively sparsely populated states can team up to stymie legislation in a 
way that the U.S. Conference of Mayors never can.231 
Similarly, cities are not in as strong a position vis-à-vis state government 
as the states stand vis-à-vis the national government. Many state legislators 
from large cities represent districts entirely within those cities and thus may 
identify with a particular city in the way that federal lawmakers identify with 
a state. More common will be legislators who represent multiple local 
jurisdictions and whose district boundaries might change over time, resulting 
in a less identifiable link to a particular city or county.232 Moreover, in almost 
all states, governors are elected by a statewide popular vote, with no 
equivalent to an electoral college.233 Cities qua cities therefore do not exercise 
the same power as states qua states in the election of the chief executive. The 
respect for local boundaries in districting in the states that have it might 
help protect local interests to some degree, but it is not as robust a 
protection as the many institutional advantages that states enjoy at the 
national level.  
The lack of strong institutional protection for local governments 
disadvantages all residents to some extent because everyone lives in a city, 
county, or both. The lack of institutional protection, however, might 
disproportionately affect residents of the largest and most densely 
populated cities because those cities often pursue the most ambitious 
policy agendas and would therefore benefit most from safeguards that 
protect them from preemption or enable them to further their agenda at the 
state or federal levels.234 Moreover, while many rural residents live in 
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counties only because they do not reside within an incorporated city, most 
urban residents live in cities and counties.  
The lack of any Wechslerian protection for cities is not necessarily a 
reason for the state judiciary to enforce a rigid “dual localism” akin to the dual 
federalism of years past, as some have suggested.235 Rather, the lack of 
Wechslerian protection merely demonstrates that the urban disadvantage 
explained in Parts III and IV is significant. Indeed, to the extent that cities 
enjoy modest institutional protection in some states, they would likely be 
better off waiving it in exchange for gerrymandering that consciously sought 
to spread urban votes around, if that could be accomplished legally and 
politically.236 Ironically, more gerrymandering of a very specific, targeted 
variety, rather than less, could help remedy the urban disadvantage in the 
lawmaking process, at least to a degree. 
CONCLUSION 
No democracy is perfect, but the violation of one-person, one-vote in the 
Senate is so severe that it impugns the entire national structure. Despite the 
occasional stray commentary by a large-state public official,237 however, there 
appears to be no significant public support for seriously reconsidering the 
Senate’s makeup. Indeed, Dahl thought there was “virtually zero” likelihood 
of reducing the extreme inequality in the Senate.238 Doing so in a manner 
consistent with the current Constitution is essentially impossible.239 The 
                                                                                                             
 235. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 232, at 1370–71. 
 236. See supra note 160 (discussing Voting Rights Act implications of 
dividing up majority-minority urban areas). 
 237. E.g., Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Introduction to JAY H. WALDER 
& HERMAN B. LEONARD, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATES 19 (22d 
ed.1998) (“[S]ometime in the next century the United States is going to have to 
address the question of apportionment in the Senate.”). 
 238. HOW DEMOCRATIC?, supra note 70, at 154. 
 239. See U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). For intriguing suggestions as to 
how the Senate malapportionment might be addressed in a manner consistent with 
article V, see Baker & Dinkin, supra note 91, at 72–74 (discussing the possibility 
of large states self-partitioning to reduce malapportionment and making one-time 
payments to small states to secure the support necessary for Congressional 
approval of new states); see also Scott J. Bowman, Note, Wild Political 
Dreaming: Constitutional Reformation of the United States Senate, 72 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1017, 1034 & n.111 (2004) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the 
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 
461 (1994)) (“[C]ouldn’t the ‘equal suffrage’ rules of Article V be easily evaded 
by two successive ‘ordinary’ amendments, the first of which repealed the equal 




Senate’s deeply undemocratic nature is so ingrained in the national political 
psyche that the public is largely oblivious to its distortive effect on legislative 
output.  
The notable flaws in the other elements of the governmental system—the 
House, the presidency, and state legislatures—are all significant even if of less 
severity. Unlike the Senate’s malapportionment, the partisan bias in the House 
and state legislatures could be fixed, at least in part, with something less than 
a federal constitutional change. For the House and state legislatures, moving 
toward proportional representation combined with at-large elections would 
help mitigate the partisan bias that currently exists. Although members of the 
Supreme Court have emphatically rejected the notion that the Constitution 
requires proportional representation, there is nothing in the Constitution that 
prohibits it either.240 Congress could simply repeal and replace the statute that 
requires single-member House districts. States are certainly free under the 
federal Constitution to adopt proportional representation or more at-large 
elections for their own legislatures, albeit subject to the federal Voting Rights 
Act. Nonetheless, there is no strong movement toward at-large or proportional 
systems raging in the political culture at the moment. Hence, the more 
practical step for achieving greater political fairness for urban areas is reducing 
partisan gerrymandering. Although eliminating such gerrymandering will not 
completely remedy the urban disadvantage, it would at least reduce it in states 
where a rural–exurban minority has a lock on the political process in a way 
disproportionate to its share of the population.  
Any changes to federal and state districting remain a very tall order, and 
progress is likely to be slow if at all existent. Meanwhile, the serious problems 
facing our nation and the world—income inequality, crumbling infrastructure, 
the devastating effects of climate change, and immigration—demand urgent 
action. Even if most Americans support climate change legislation, for 
instance, and most of that majority lives in urban America, it is very unlikely 
that the national government will produce such legislation. Similarly, if most 
Floridians support extended health insurance, and most or much of that 
majority resides in Florida’s urban areas, the systematic underrepresentation 
of those residents’ views in the state legislature will greatly hinder the ability 
of those views to turn into law.  
Given the federal and state systems’ propensity to block an urban-
centered majority from implementing its will, it is only natural for that 
majority to look to governments at the local level—city, county, or metro—
                                                                                                             
suffrage rules themselves, and the second of which reapportioned the Senate?”) 
(arguing that two amendments could reapportion the Senate, with the first being 
the one that struck the Equal Suffrage Clause). 
 240. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.). 




for action. Even if modest and uneven, the successes at the local level give 
voice to the muted majority. The ability of local government to serve as an 
outlet for policy ideas is limited, however, by a large number of factors, 
including the relatively small size and scale of local government. Reforming 
the health care market, for instance, is hard to do in Miami alone due to issues 
of both scale and law. Miami cannot, on its own, opt into a Medicaid 
expansion under the Affordable Care Act even if its residents favor such 
action. In addition to federal law, numerous state law doctrines—from 
Dillon’s Rule to home rule, preemption to imperio home rule—prescribe and 
proscribe the powers of local government. Having elucidated the urban 
disadvantage in this Article, the second article in this series will explore 
whether and how state home rule doctrine might remedy the disadvantage. 
APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 - U.S. POPULATION, HOUSE SEATS, AND ELECTORAL 













California 38,332,521 37,253,956 33,871,648 53 55 
Texas 26,448,193 25,145,561 20,851,820 36 38 
New York 19,651,127 19,378,102 18,976,457 27 29 
Florida 19,552,860 18,801,310 15,982,378 27 29 
Illinois 12,882,135 12,830,632 12,419,293 18 20 
Pennsylvania 12,773,801 12,702,379 12,281,054 18 20 
Ohio 11,570,808 11,536,504 11,353,140 16 18 
Georgia 9,992,167 9,687,653 8,186,453 14 16 
Michigan 9,895,622 9,883,640 9,938,444 14 16 
North Carolina 9,848,060 9,535,483 8,049,313 13 15 
New Jersey 8,899,339 8,791,894 8,414,350 12 14 
Virginia 8,260,405 8,001,024 7,078,515 11 13 
Washington 6,971,406 6,724,540 5,894,121 10 12 
Massachusetts 6,692,824 6,547,629 6,349,097 9 11 
Arizona 6,626,624 6,392,017 5,130,632 9 11 
                                                                                                             
 241. The 2013 population data was obtained from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL 
ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2013 (2014). 
 242. The 2010 population data was obtained from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2010: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2011). 
 243. The 2000 population data was obtained from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CENSUS 2000 (2001) (Table 1, "States Ranked by Population: 2000"). 
 244. Data for the apportionment of representatives in the House in 2010 was 
obtained from Congressional Apportionment, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Apportionment/Apportionment/ 
[https://perma.cc/BJ9R-5ELH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 245. Distribution of Electoral Votes, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm [https://perma.cc/CA2Q-L49S] (last 
updated Oct. 3, 2003). 




Indiana 6,570,902 6,483,802 6,080,485 9 11 
Tennessee 6,495,978 6,346,105 5,689,283 9 11 
Missouri 6,044,171 5,988,927 5,595,211 8 10 
Maryland 5,928,814 5,773,552 5,296,486 8 10 
Wisconsin 5,742,713 5,686,986 5,363,675 8 10 
Minnesota 5,420,380 5,303,925 4,919,479 8 10 
Colorado 5,268,367 5,029,196 4,301,261 7 9 
Alabama 4,833,722 4,779,736 4,447,100 7 9 
South Carolina 4,774,839 4,625,364 4,012,012 7 9 
Louisiana 4,625,470 4,533,372 4,468,976 6 8 
Kentucky 4,395,295 4,339,367 4,041,769 6 8 
Oregon 3,930,065 3,831,074 3,421,399 5 7 
Oklahoma 3,850,568 3,751,351 3,450,654 5 7 
Connecticut 3,596,080 3,574,097 3,405,565 5 7 
Iowa 3,090,416 3,046,355 2,926,324 4 6 
Mississippi 2,991,207 2,967,297 2,844,658 4 6 
Arkansas 2,959,373 2,915,918 2,673,400 4 6 
Utah 2,900,872 2,763,885 2,233,169 4 6 
Kansas 2,893,957 2,853,118 2,688,418 4 6 
Nevada 2,790,136 2,700,551 1,998,257 4 6 
New Mexico 2,085,287 2,059,179 1,819,046 3 5 
Nebraska 1,868,516 1,826,341 1,711,263 3 5 
West Virginia 1,854,304 1,852,994 1,808,344 3 5 
Idaho 1,612,136 1,567,582 1,293,953 2 4 
Hawaii 1,404,054 1,360,301 1,211,537 2 4 
Maine 1,328,302 1,328,361 1,274,923 2 4 
New Hampshire 1,323,459 1,316,470 1,235,786 2 4 
Rhode Island 1,051,511 1,052,567 1,048,319 2 4 
Montana 1,015,165 989,415 902,195 1 3 
Delaware 925,749 897,934 783,600 1 3 
South Dakota 844,877 814,180 754,844 1 3 
Alaska 735,132 710,231 626,932 1 3 
North Dakota 723,393 672,591 642,200 1 3 
Vermont 626,630 625,741 608,827 1 3 
Wyoming 582,658 563,626 493,782 1 3 
D.C. 646,449 601,723 572,059 1 3 
Total 
50 states 
315,482,390 308,143,815 280,849,847 435 535 
Total 
50 states and D.C. 
316,128,839 308,745,538 281,421,906 435 538 
Total 
50 states and all 
territories 
- 312,913,872 285,620,445 435 538 
 
  




TABLE 2 - U.S. POPULATION PER HOUSE SEAT, U.S. POPULATION AS 
PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION, NUMBER OF SENATORS 





















seat senate  
(% x 1000) 
California 723,255 702,905 12.15% 12.09% 122 
Texas 734,672 698,488 8.38% 8.16% 84 
New York 727,820 717,707 6.23% 6.29% 62 
Florida 724,180 696,345 6.20% 6.10% 62 
Illinois 715,674 712,813 4.08% 4.16% 41 
Pennsylvania 709,656 705,688 4.05% 4.12% 40 
Ohio 723,176 721,032 3.67% 3.74% 37 
Georgia 713,726 691,975 3.17% 3.14% 32 
Michigan 706,830 705,974 3.14% 3.21% 31 
North Carolina 757,543 733,499 3.12% 3.09% 31 
New Jersey 741,612 732,658 2.82% 2.85% 28 
Virginia 750,946 727,366 2.62% 2.60% 26 
Washington 697,141 672,454 2.21% 2.18% 22 
Massachusetts 743,647 727,514 2.12% 2.12% 21 
Arizona 736,292 710,224 2.10% 2.07% 21 
Indiana 730,100 720,422 2.08% 2.10% 21 
Tennessee 721,775 705,123 2.06% 2.06% 21 
Missouri 755,521 748,616 1.92% 1.94% 19 
Maryland 741,102 721,694 1.88% 1.87% 19 
Wisconsin 717,839 710,873 1.82% 1.85% 18 
Minnesota 677,548 662,991 1.72% 1.72% 17 
Colorado 752,624 718,457 1.67% 1.63% 17 
Alabama 690,532 682,819 1.53% 1.55% 15 
South Carolina 682,120 660,766 1.51% 1.50% 15 
Louisiana 770,912 755,562 1.47% 1.47% 15 
Kentucky 732,549 723,228 1.39% 1.41% 14 
Oregon 786,013 766,215 1.25% 1.24% 13 
Oklahoma 770,114 750,270 1.22% 1.22% 12 
Connecticut 719,216 714,819 1.14% 1.16% 11 
Iowa 772,604 761,589 0.98% 0.99% 10 
Mississippi 747,802 741,824 0.95% 0.96% 10 
Arkansas 739,843 728,980 0.94% 0.95% 9 
Utah 725,218 690,971 0.92% 0.90% 9 
Kansas 723,489 713,280 0.92% 0.93% 9 
Nevada 697,534 675,138 0.88% 0.88% 9 
New Mexico 695,096 686,393 0.66% 0.67% 7 
Nebraska 622,839 608,780 0.59% 0.59% 6 
West Virginia 618,101 617,665 0.59% 0.60% 6 
Idaho 806,068 783,791 0.51% 0.51% 5 
Hawaii 702,027 680,151 0.45% 0.44% 5 
Maine 664,151 664,181 0.42% 0.43% 4 
New Hampshire 661,730 658,235 0.42% 0.43% 4 
Rhode Island 525,756 526,284 0.33% 0.34% 3 
Montana 1,015,165 989,415 0.32% 0.32% 3 
Delaware 925,749 897,934 0.29% 0.29% 3 
South Dakota 844,877 814,180 0.27% 0.26% 3 
Alaska 735,132 710,231 0.23% 0.23% 2 
North Dakota 723,393 672,591 0.23% 0.22% 2 
Vermont 626,630 625,741 0.20% 0.20% 2 
Wyoming 582,658 563,626 0.18% 0.18% 2 





TABLE 3 - 2013 U.S. POPULATION TOTALS 
 
Portion of population Total 
Percent of 
total 
Total population of largest 30 states 282,965,672 89.69% 
Total population of largest 20 states 239,180,470 75.81% 
Total population of largest 17 states246  221,464,772 70.20% 
Total population of largest 5 states 116,866,836 37.04% 
Total population of smallest 20 states 32,516,718 10.31% 
Total population of smallest 19 states plus 1/2 Mississippi 31,021,115 9.83% 
Total population of smallest 5 states 3,512,690 1.11% 
 
TABLE 4 - MANCHIN–TOOMEY SENATE VOTE (APRIL 2013) 
 
State 2010 population247 Vote248 
California 37,341,989 Y Y 
Colorado 5,044,930 Y Y 
Connecticut 3,581,628 Y Y 
Delaware 900,877 Y Y 
Hawaii 1,366,862 Y Y 
Illinois 12,864,380 Y Y 
Maine 1,333,074 Y Y 
Maryland 5,789,929 Y Y 
Massachusetts 6,559,644 Y Y 
Michigan 9,911,626 Y Y 
Minnesota 5,314,879 Y Y 
New Jersey 8,807,501 Y Y 
New Mexico 2,067,273 Y Y 
New York 19,421,055 Y Y 
Oregon 3,848,606 Y Y 
Pennsylvania 12,734,905 Y Y 
Rhode Island 1,055,247 Y Y 
Vermont 630,337 Y Y 
Virginia 8,037,736 Y Y 
Washington 6,753,369 Y Y 
West Virginia 1,859,815 Y Y 
Total population fully in favor 155,225,662   
Arizona 6,412,700 Y N 
Florida 18,900,773 Y N 
Indiana 6,501,582 Y N 
Iowa 3,053,787 Y N 
Louisiana 4,553,962 Y N 
Missouri 6,011,478 Y N 
Nevada 2,709,432 Y N 
New Hampshire 1,321,445 Y N 
North Carolina 9,565,781 Y N 
Ohio 11,568,495 Y N 
South Dakota 819,761 Y N 
Wisconsin 5,698,230 Y N 
Montana 994,416 Y N 
Total population half in favor 78,111,842   
Alabama 4,802,982 N N 
Alaska 721,523 N N 
                                                                                                             
 246. Required for Senate ratification blocking.  
 247. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 242. 
 248. See Senate Roll Call Vote No. 97, supra note 98. 




Arkansas 2,926,229 N N 
Georgia 9,727,566 N N 
Idaho 1,573,499 N N 
Kansas 2,863,813 N N 
Kentucky 4,350,606 N N 
Mississippi 2,978,240 N N 
Nebraska 1,831,825 N N 
North Dakota 675,905 N N 
Oklahoma 3,764,882 N N 
South Carolina 4,645,975 N N 
Tennessee 6,375,431 N N 
Texas 25,268,418 N N 
Utah 2,770,765 N N 
Wyoming 568,300 N N 
Total population fully against 75,845,959   
Total population 309,183,463   
Total in favor 194,281,583 63%  
Total against 114,901,880 37%  
District of Columbia 601,723 Y Y 
 
TABLE 5 - RFRA MOTION TO PROCEED VOTE (JUNE 2014) 
 
State 2010 population249 Vote250 
Alaska 721,523 Y Y 
California 37,341,989 Y Y 
Colorado 5,044,930 Y Y 
Connecticut 3,581,628 Y Y 
Delaware 900,877 Y Y 
Hawaii251 1,366,862 Y - 
Illinois 12,864,380 Y Y 
Maine 1,333,074 Y Y 
Maryland 5,789,929 Y Y 
Massachusetts 6,559,644 Y Y 
Michigan 9,911,626 Y Y 
Minnesota 5,314,879 Y Y 
Montana 994,416 Y Y 
New Jersey 8,807,501 Y Y 
New Mexico 2,067,273 Y Y 
New York 19,421,055 Y Y 
Oregon 3,848,606 Y Y 
Rhode Island 1,055,247 Y Y 
Vermont 630,337 Y Y 
Virginia 8,037,736 Y Y 
Washington 6,753,369 Y Y 
West Virginia 1,859,815 Y Y 
Total population fully in favor 143,523,265   
Arkansas 2,926,229 Y N 
Florida 18,900,773 Y N 
Indiana 6,501,582 Y N 
Iowa 3,053,787 Y N 
Louisiana 4,553,962 Y N 
Missouri 6,011,478 Y N 
                                                                                                             
 249. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 242. 
 250. See Senate Roll Call Vote No. 228, supra note 101. 
 251. Hawaii's population is halved because one of its senators (Brian Schatz) 
did not vote. Id. 




Nevada 2,709,432 Y N 
New Hampshire 1,321,445 Y N 
North Carolina 9,565,781 Y N 
Ohio 11,568,495 Y N 
Pennsylvania 12,734,905 Y N 
South Dakota 819,761 Y N 
Wisconsin 5,698,230 Y N 
Total population half in favor 86,365,860   
Alabama 4,802,982 N N 
Arizona 6,412,700 N N 
Georgia 9,727,566 N N 
Idaho 1,573,499 N N 
Kansas 2,863,813 N N 
Kentucky 4,350,606 N N 
Mississippi 2,978,240 N N 
Nebraska 1,831,825 N N 
North Dakota 675,905 N N 
Oklahoma 3,764,882 N N 
South Carolina 4,645,975 N N 
Tennessee 6,375,431 N N 
Texas 25,268,418 N N 
Utah 2,770,765 N N 
Wyoming 568,300 N N 
Total population fully against 78,610,907   
Total population 308,500,032   
     
Total in favor 186,706,195 61%  
Total against 121,793,837 39%  
District of Columbia 601,723 Y Y 
 
TABLE 6 - 1910 U.S. POPULATION BY STATE 
 
State Population252 Population as % of total 
New York 7,268,894 9.74% 
Pennsylvania 6,302,115 8.45% 
Illinois 4,821,550 6.46% 
Ohio 4,157,545 5.57% 
Missouri 3,106,665 4.16% 
Total population of largest 5 states 25,656,769 34.39% 
Texas 3,048,710 4.09% 
Massachusetts 2,805,346 3.76% 
Indiana 2,516,462 3.37% 
Michigan 2,420,982 3.24% 
Iowa 2,231,853 2.99% 
Georgia 2,216,331 2.97% 
Kentucky 2,147,174 2.88% 
Wisconsin 2,069,042 2.77% 
Tennessee 2,020,616 2.71% 
North Carolina 1,893,810 2.54% 
                                                                                                             
 252. Population data for 1910, for states Alabama through Montana, was 
obtained from 2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH 
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1910 (1915). Population data for 1910, for states 
Nebraska through Wyoming, was obtained from 3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1910 
(1913).   




New Jersey 1,883,669 2.52% 
Virginia 1,854,184 2.49% 
Alabama 1,828,697 2.45% 
Minnesota 1,751,394 2.35% 
Mississippi 1,551,270 2.08% 
California 1,485,053 1.99% 
Kansas 1,470,495 1.97% 
Louisiana 1,381,625 1.85% 
South Carolina 1,340,316 1.80% 
Arkansas 1,311,564 1.76% 
Maryland 1,188,044 1.59% 
Nebraska 1,066,300 1.43% 
West Virginia 958,800 1.29% 
Connecticut 908,420 1.22% 
Maine 694,466 0.93% 
Colorado 539,700 0.72% 
Florida 528,542 0.71% 
Washington 518,103 0.69% 
Rhode Island 428,556 0.57% 
Oregon 413,536 0.55% 
New Hampshire 411,588 0.55% 
South Dakota 401,570 0.54% 
Vermont 343,641 0.46% 
North Dakota 319,146 0.43% 
Utah 276,749 0.37% 
Montana 243,329 0.33% 
Delaware 184,735 0.25% 
Idaho 161,772 0.22% 
Wyoming 92,531 0.12% 
Nevada 42,335 0.06% 
Total population of smallest 5 states 724,702 0.97% 
Total population 74,607,225 100% 
 
TABLE 7 - 1950 U.S. POPULATION BY STATE 
 
State Population253 Population as % of total 
New York 14,830,192 9.83% 
California 10,586,223 7.01% 
Pennsylvania 10,498,012 6.96% 
Illinois 8,712,176 5.77% 
Ohio 7,946,627 5.27% 
Total population of largest 5 states 52,573,230 34.83% 
Texas 7,748,000 5.13% 
Michigan 6,421,000 4.25% 
New Jersey 4,860,000 3.22% 
Massachusetts 4,690,000 3.11% 
North Carolina 4,060,000 2.69% 
Indiana 3,952,000 2.62% 
Missouri 3,946,000 2.61% 
Georgia 3,451,000 2.29% 
Wisconsin 3,449,000 2.29% 
Tennessee 3,304,000 2.19% 
Virginia 3,262,000 2.16% 
Alabama 3,060,000 2.03% 
                                                                                                             
 253. Population data for 1950 was obtained from 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 (1952). 




Minnesota 2,995,000 1.98% 
Kentucky 2,957,000 1.96% 
Florida 2,821,000 1.87% 
Louisiana 2,701,000 1.79% 
Iowa 2,621,000 1.74% 
Washington 2,386,000 1.58% 
Maryland 2,376,000 1.57% 
Oklahoma 2,193,000 1.45% 
Mississippi 2,169,000 1.44% 
South Carolina 2,119,000 1.40% 
Connecticut 2,007,280 1.33% 
West Virginia 2,006,000 1.33% 
Kansas 1,915,000 1.27% 
Arkansas 1,906,000 1.26% 
Oregon 1,532,000 1.02% 
Colorado 1,337,000 0.89% 
Nebraska 1,324,000 0.88% 
Maine 911,000 0.60% 
District of Columbia 814,000 0.54% 
Rhode Island 779,000 0.52% 
Arizona 756,000 0.50% 
Utah 696,000 0.46% 
New Mexico 687,000 0.46% 
South Dakota 652,000 0.43% 
North Dakota 616,000 0.41% 
Montana 598,000 0.40% 
Idaho 592,000 0.39% 
New Hampshire 531,000 0.35% 
Vermont 377,000 0.25% 
Delaware 321,000 0.21% 
Wyoming 292,000 0.19% 
Nevada 162,000 0.11% 
Total population of smallest 5 states 1,683,000 1.12% 
Total population 150,925,510 100% 
 
